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Stuart Thompson

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Orange Juice Blues

daily bloggings and such
April 09

Discontinuation of MSN Blog - Launch of new blog

I am no longer posting at this blog. From now on I will only post at stuartathompson.blogspot.com. It is a much better service.
April 07

An Argument of Responsibility Against the Victim of Rape

I was having a non-heated conversation with a female friend of mine who seemed at first to concede to a passing notion about the responsibility of rape. More specifically, who is responsible after a rape. Now of course it is astounding to think anyone would attribute responsibility to the woman for the rape itself (presuming the situation in question is a man raping a woman--so from now on the woman will be called the "victim" to regard universality). I am not arguing this point.

What I am arguing, and intended to argue during the aforementioned conversation although without much finesse, is that the victim is at least partially responsible for the situation that has been created. I argue this point for recreation and because I think it is sound--at least to me at this point. I encourage opposition. (I'm also doing this briefly since few enjoy reading novel-length posts.)

I will argue via analogy and it shall not apply to cases of rape where the victim has made no decision (i.e. situations where they are incapacitated or otherwise compromised in their decision-making). The most appropriate situation to which this applies would be, for example, the victim meeting the offender at a public establishment and then inviting them to a private space or accepting an invite to a private space.

It does not apply to many other situations but it would tiresome to spell those out in fine detail. One such situation would be, for example, a spontaneous rape that offered no decision-making on the part of the victim. I also wish to add that the majority of rapes occur between a close acquaintance of the victim (i.e. an ex-boyfriend)--a situation that would not follow this analogy.

Imagine, then, that you are standing at the bottom of a skyscraper. You decide that you would rather enjoy an elevator ride to the roof. You do so knowing that the roof is a dangerous place to be.

You get to the roof and upon arrival you are impossibly excited by the view. So you go to the ledge of the roof--with full knowledge of the danger, however improbable, that you may be injured. You are enamored, to be sure, but you have your wits about you.

So then imagine yourself on the ledge of the roof peering down to the city below. You then, by whatever impossible feat, and by no means of your own doing (you neither lost your balance nor were you being neglectful of the seriousness of your situation) fall off the roof and plunge downwards.

Who is responsible here?

Certainly, as I described, you are not responsible for actually falling off the roof. That event was out of your control. But are you completely eliminated of any responsibility at all for being on the roof to begin with? In other words: Is the fact that you fell off the roof a warranted dismissal of the fact that you should never have entered the roof to begin with? If you think that you are at least somewhat responsible here, then I propose the same for situations of rape.

Opponents of the view put forth here, to which I will call it the roof analogy, will likely argue that this applies equally to many other situations other than rape, thus denigrating its strength. For example: Is not every person in a car crash somewhat responsible even when it was not their fault? Because, following the analogy, they entered the car--a dangerous situation--to begin with, knowing all the while that something dangerous may happen. I must say that to me this does not seem at all too wild; are you not at least somewhat responsible even if this responsibility never brings about any ramifications? Nevertheless I shall argue in lieu of this defense.

In response let us bolster the analogy. This time, imagine the same scenario, except it is not an autonomous decision but rather one accompanied by another individual. This time, as you stare upwards at the skyscraper, a passerby taps your shoulder and begins a conversation. After whatever amount of time conversing, let us say 1hr, he suggests you both take a ride to the top. You agree. When you arrive at the top, the passerby suggests you both go to the ledge. You agree. And once upon the ledge, with your back turned, the passerby shoves you in the back and you slip over the edge.

If you never went to the roof to begin with, you would not have been in the dangerous situation that would lead to your eventual fall from the roof. Of course, the passerby could hardly shove you in the middle of the sidewalk and cause as much harm. It was your decision, or your collective decision, that led you both to the roof. You voluntarily agreed to go to the roof. This seems to be to be akin to rape.

I think, at least at this late hour, that most people would concede here that the victim is responsible, at least in part, for the final situation that has been created. This does not in any sense eliminate nor diminish the responsibility of the passerby; they would be as much guilty now as before. And this is the most important idea of all.

Relating to the car comparison for a moment: it would hardly eliminate the responsibility of a drunk driver who collided with an innocent driver if the innocent driver admitted that they entered the car--a dangerous situation--with full knowledge that they may be struck. I believe that in most situations the driver would say, "Of course! A car is a dangerous thing and I entered it willingly!" The drunk driver is of course responsible--he should be summarily punished. And similarly with the rapist--they are certainly the lowest, most vile examples of what humanity can become. However, admitting to responsibility where responsibility lies merely accepts an empirical fact. If a victim is at least somewhat responsible for at least somehow aiding to the dangerous circumstances that fostered their eventual violation, it does no injustice to concede to it.

The syllogism can be as follows:
(Let "a dangerous situation" be any situation where there is a possible negative outcome. )
P1: If one voluntarily enters a dangerous situation, then they are responsible for doing so.
P2: In situations of rape where one is complicit in the decision-making process that fosters a setting conducive to rape, they are voluntarily entering a dangerous situation.
C: One is responsible for entering a situation conducive to rape.

Premise 1 seems to need little defense. I have used "a dangerous situation" even though P1 functions with just "a situation" because it is necessary to clarify Premise 2. I think it would be insufficient (and nonsensical) to argue that "they are voluntarily entering a situation" as opposed to "a dangerous situation"; well of course they are entering a situation, but it is the danger associated to the situation that makes the premise original and definitive. The validity of P2 rests on the analogy set forth thus far, and I think it does justice to the provisions I have already outlined. The conclusion then follows the from the two premises in proper correlating fashion.

So it is here that I will end this post. I hope I have done justice to my argument. I hope too that if you have read to this point you will at least leave a comment--either agreeing or disagreeing, although I would prefer at least a Devil's advocate disagreement. I may revisit this again soon to review what I have said and likely add more to clarify.

It is certainly troubling to say that a woman is in any way "responsible" after such a terrible act. I find myself irked by what is written here. But the fact that it is difficult to say, difficult to write, or difficult to practice is in no way a rebuttal to the ideas put forth here. It is rather shocking to think that responsibility will only be attributed in situations where it satisfies our desire for appropriateness.

April 03

Unresolved Animal Rights


This paper discusses arguments concerning animal rights and concludes that Mary Anne Warren’s action-inaction argument is the strongest of those offered in James E. White’s textbook Contemporary Moral Problems. The first argument to be discussed is Peter Singer’s speciesism as developed in “All Animals are Equal.” Following this will be Tom Regan’s “The Case for Animal Rights” and his argument of inherent value. Finally, Warren’s “Difficulties with the Strong Animal Rights Position” will be revealed as the most coherent solution to the inadequacies found in previous arguments. However, none of these arguments reach a definitive answer to the question of animal rights. In all cases, more needs to be said to improve or substantiate their position. Approximately half of this paper is devoted to the exegesis of the author’s arguments to provide a comprehensive examination of their conclusions.

 

SINGER’S SPECIESISM

In “All Animals Are Equal,” Singer likens the discrimination of animals to that of women or blacks, following that if sexism and racism are morally wrong, then so must be speciesism: “…a prejudice or attitude of bias toward the interests of members of one’s own species against those members of other species” (Singer 382). Singer—writing in the voice of his opponents—argues that equality between men and women need not be extended to non-human animals because men and women are similar and should therefore have similar rights, while humans and non-humans are different and should not have equal rights (Singer 379). He then makes the distinction that “these differences [between humans and non-humans] must give rise to some differences in the rights that each have,” however the recognition of this is no justification for denying basic equality to animals (ibid). While a child in America may have rights to an education, equal consideration for a pig may only require that we leave it alone (Singer 381). When speaking of animal rights, the differences between human and non-human animals will preclude “equal or identical treatment,” but this should not exclude non-human animals from “equal consideration” (Singer 380).

            Singer then links racism and sexism to speciesism by eliminating the requirements of intelligence, moral or physical abilities, or other matters of fact from “equal consideration” (Singer 381; 380). Society does not, for example, distinguish separate basic rights for the most intelligent individuals; nor do we say that the mentally incompetent have fewer rights than those with average intelligence. Similarly, Singer argues that the principle of equality is not a product of any sort of actual equality among humans, but is the prescription of how we should treat humans (Singer 381). Equality, then, is more of a moral idea than an assertion or description of fact (ibid). Having established that the denial of rights based solely on one’s species is unjustified, Singer argues that if we do not discriminate against members of our species for factors such as impaired intelligence then doing so to non-human animals for the comparable factors would be speciesism—and would therefore be wrong. Singer writes, “It is on the basis that the case against racism and against sexism must both ultimately rest; and it is in accordance with this principle that the attitude that we may call ‘speciesism,’ by way of analogy” (382).

The strength of the speciesism argument rests in its simplicity. Discrimination promoted by means of a bias towards one species over another could be labeled little else but “speciesism.” Actions that promote this prejudice would thus be labeled as such, similarly with racism where such acts prejudicing blacks must also be labeled racism. To deny that speciesism occurs where such clear prejudice is present would be, by the same token, to deny that racism or sexism occurs where prejudices are equally as present. Nevertheless, there are likely few scenarios where the source of this prejudice is so clear, so obvious or so profound as to be labeled speciesism so easily or exclusively, or if prejudice occurs at all when a decision must be made regarding human versus non-human use. Moreover, if the act of speciesism does occur it is still difficult to conclude that the action should never be performed. It is possible to concede to the existence of speciesism, yet still discriminate against animals in certain situations.

Singer points to his own “park kidnapping” analogy, conceding to his opponents that it would be more acceptable to kidnap horses from a park at any time than it would be for humans, since humans have the capacity to be fearful of this possibility and would suffer in a way that horses could not. Therefore, a violation of animal rights can occur here and the act of speciesism would not have been committed. In response, Singer argues that this justifies selecting infants or the mentally deficient in the same scenario. However, he contradicts this argument in his conclusion when he writes, “The preference, in normal cases, for saving a human life over the life of an animal when a choice has to be made is a preference based on the characteristics that normal humans have, and not on the mere fact that they are members of our own species” (Singer 387). The implication being that normal humans collectively have a predisposition to prefer our own species over others when we are forced into a situation that requires us to decide between them; this predisposition is based on human nature, not an act of discrimination. The park kidnapping analogy is not then considered to be (strict) speciesism, not even when we prefer to kidnap the horse rather than the infant.

If the preference for using the horse seems at least somewhat acceptable here, then the theory is not sufficient in encompassing the breadth of the animal rights argument—more needs to be said. The simplicity of the speciesism argument allows it to succeed by suturing itself to the moral principles that make racism and sexism so reprehensible. Yet at the same time, it promotes a moral duality where either an action against animals is speciesism or it is not, without addressing the inherent complications that will likely arise in practice. Singer writes to these very complications: “What we need is some middle position… What we must do is bring non-human animals within our sphere of moral concern and cease to treat their lives as expendable for whatever trivial purposes we may have” (Singer 386). Both Regan and Warren attempt to do this in their subsequent papers by providing a more comprehensive approach to the animal rights argument.

 

REGAN’S INHERENT VALUE

Regan calls for the total abolition, dissolution and elimination of animals in science, agriculture and hunting (Regan 388). He argues, “You don’t change unjust institutions by tidying them up” (ibid). He brings forth three theories (one against and two in support of animal rights) which he deems inadequate.

            His first criticism attacks the view that humans have only indirect duties to animals. According to this theory, it is only possible to “do wrong acts that involve animals, and so we have duties regarding them, though none to them” (Regan 389). Contractarianism is cited in support of indirect duties. This theory is as follows:

…morality consists of a set of rules that individuals voluntarily agree to abide by, as we do when we sign a contract… Those who understand and accept the terms of the contract are covered directly… And these contractors can also have protection spelled out for others who, though they lack the ability to understand morality and so cannot sign the contract themselves, are loved or cherished by those who can. (Regan 390)

 

Regan’s criticism of this theory stems from the implication that the collective group of contractors is responsible for enforcing the rules of the contract. Without this enforcement, injustice can occur “so long as no one else—no contractor, or too few of them—cares about it” (Regan 390). The South African apartheid system would have been justified under Contractarianism if few white South Africans were upset by it (ibid).[1]

Some brief criticism of Regan’s approach to Contractarianism would be apropos here. He concludes of his analysis: “The version of Contractarianism just examined is, as I have noted, a crude variety, and in fairness to those of a contractarian persuasion it must be noted that much more refined, subtle and ingenious varieties are possible” (Regan 390). He devotes a few sentences to John Rawls’ version of Contractarianism, which differs by “ignor[ing] the accidental features of being a human being” (ibid). He concludes however that “it systematically denies that we have direct duties to those human beings who do not have a sense of justice” such as children (Regan 391). Regardless of this cursory dismissal, Regan should have adhered to the Charity Principle by criticizing the “ingenious” versions of Contractarianism from the very beginning in order to bolster his argument even further. Unfortunately it falls outside of the limits of this paper to discuss the accuracy of or relevance of Rawls’ theory and without more knowledge it is impossible to resolve the soundness of Regan’s criticism. However doing so is not necessary; it is enough to say that Regan’s argument would be strengthened by making the complete case against this or other “more refined, subtle and ingenious varieties” of Contractarianism rather than the “crude” variety.

The second theory that Regan criticizes is cruelty-kindness. This view declares, “…we have a direct duty to be kind to animals and a direct duty not to be cruel to them” (Regan 391). This proves inadequate to Regan however since it is possible to be kind to animals and still discriminate against them—and vice versa with cruelty. Consider kindness for example: A white racist can be kind to blacks but award special privileges towards members of his own race, thus meeting the requisites for kindness without acting morally appropriate (ibid). Similarly a doctor who performs abortions may be a kind, loving individual, who is quite uncruel in his everyday dealings, but his actions may (arguably) be considered cruel (ibid). The avoidance of cruelty and the promotion of kindness should of course be considered in dealings with animals, but they should not, according to Regan, come to define the entirety of our obligations to these animals (ibid). Warren later comes to accept this criticism and writes, “The inadequacy of the anti-cruelty view provides one practical reason for speaking of animal rights” (Warren 402).

            The final theory he comes to criticize is one based on utilitarianism. His theory of inherent value is born of this criticism, as he argues utilitarianism only recognizes the satisfaction of an individual's feelings, not the individual themself—their inherent value. He writes:

[An act] might not be the same one that would bring about the best results for me personally, or for my family or friends, or for a lab animal. The best aggregated consequences for everyone concerned are not necessarily the best for each individual. That utilitarianism is an aggregative theory… is the key objection to this theory. (Regan 392)

 

According to Regan’s view of utilitarianism, he would be morally justified in killing his Aunt Bea if a large portion of the inheritance money went to a children’s hospital. The positive aggregative consequences of killing Aunt Bea would outweigh the negative consequences. He concludes of utilitarianism, “A good end does not justify an evil means” (Regan 393).

In the place of these theories, Regan supposes we ought to consider “that you and I, for example, do have value as individuals—what we’ll call inherent value” (ibid). This attempts to resolve the anti-individualist nature of utilitarianism by postulating that we are equal as individuals, instead of receptacles, regardless of our sex, race, religion, etc. (Regan 393). Moreover, all who have inherent value have it equally and are entitled to equal rights—it does not come in degrees (ibid).

Labeling it a rights-based view, he argues that the theory “in principle denies the moral tolerability of any and all forms of racial, sexual and social discrimination; and unlike utilitarianism, this view in principle denies that we can justify good results by using evil means that violate an individuals rights” (Regan 393). Since all humans and non-humans, according to Regan, are conscious creatures with an individual welfare having importance to us independent of our use to others, we are all thus what he terms “experiencing subjects of a life” (ibid).

Defending against human elitism (“only humans have such value”), he notes some individuals who fail to meet these requisites for intelligence or reason. However society still places equal value on the mentally deficient or infants regardless of these distinguishing factors (ibid). To say that Homo sapiens are the only ones worthy of inherent value is “blatant speciesism” (Regan 394). These are the principles of Regan's theory of inherent value.

Warren offers a most succinct criticism of Regan’s theory in her paper. This criticism will first be elaborated upon before moving to her argument.[2]

Warren argues that inherent value is offered as a natural property, as a postulate, and is defined in negative terms entirely—by what it is not, instead of by what it is. Regan seems to define inherent value as:

…not dependent upon the value which either the inherently valuable individual or anyone else may place upon that individual’s life experiences. It is not (necessarily) a function of sentience… It cannot attach to anything other than an individual. (Warren 398)

 

As a postulate, we are left to assume that experiencing subjects of a life have inherent value justified by “certain absurdities which he thinks follow from a purely utilitarian theory” (Warren 398).[3] However, Regan’s connection between having value awarded to it inherently and having moral rights for the same reasons does not follow according to Warren. For example, trees and rivers seem to be inherently valuable but “are not the sorts of things which can have moral rights” (ibid). Without a description of how inherent value is defined in positive terms, it is difficult to understand the connection between inherent value and anything else—especially moral rights. Warren concludes of this that inherent value should seek to appeal to the natural property to which it is based upon instead of postulating about its existence in relation to its negative terms (Warren 399).

            Regan’s dichotomy—animals either have full inherent value or none at all—forces an eventual “sharp line” between those who have moral rights and those who have none whatsoever (Warren 399). With most theories, Warren argues, unclear cases pose little problem to the stability of the theory since they can often be supplemented with additional provisions (Warren 400). But here, with such a strict duality, cases such as fish, reptiles, octopi or insects make it impossible at this time to conclude whether they are an experiencing subject of a life or not (Warren 399). Taking a “benefit of the doubt” approach, as Regan suggests, forces us to include a vast number of unclear cases into the realm of moral rights creating obligations we cannot possibly fulfill. Warren appears to agree with Singer in that theorists will require some sort of “middle ground” to establish a form of animal rights without subscribing to an unreasonable amount of protection for unclear cases. As she writes, “I do not think that the moral rights of most non-human animals are identical in strength to those of persons. The rights of most non-human animals may be overridden in circumstances which would not justify overriding the rights of persons” (Warren 397).

 

WARREN’S ACTION-INACTION

            Warren prefaces her argument with an exposition of the two current theories that encompass the majority of animal rights arguments. The “strong animal rights position”—seemingly labeled as “strong” due to its radical nature as opposed to its strength as a coherent theory—is essentially Regan’s position: “Non-human mammals have essentially the same right not to be harmed or killed as we do” (Warren 366-367). The second theory is the “weak animal rights position”: “There are… compelling realities which sometimes require that we kill animals for reasons which could not justify the killing of persons” (Warren 397). This position does not deny animal rights, merely concedes that there are times when a decision regarding that of a non-human animal will not necessarily parallel that concerning a human.

            Warren’s action-inaction argument spawns from the weak animal rights position. Here she suggests that the only clear moral difference between humans and animals is that “people are at least sometimes capable of being moved to action or inaction by the force of a reasoned argument” (Warren 400). Its moral relevance is linked to the ability for those with the capacity to communicate—which “may require something like a human language”—to cooperate and resolve problems without violence (ibid). At the same time, this capacity enables us to be “more dangerous than non-rational beings can ever be” (ibid). Thus the recognition of moral equality in others stems from our ability to communicate, requiring an articulated system of morality to regulate our conduct.

The argument fails to extend these rights to animals immediately since “we cannot reason with most non-human animals, we cannot always solve the problem which they may cause without harming them” (Warren 401). Of course if there are animals that learn to reason with us or if we discover new ways to reason with animals, then we will be obliged to view them and treat them as our moral equivalents (ibid). The argument bypasses the elitist human criticism by conceding that the ability to communicate fails to make us “better” or even more intelligent, since faulty reasoning “reduces our effective intelligence rather than increasing it” (Warren 400).

Here is the expected criticism regarding infants or mentally deficient humans who still receive equal rights even though they fail to posses the capacity for communication. Instead of adding provisions or refining her argument, Warren clarifies that awarding rights to these individuals in no way proves that non-human animals have the same privilege. She writes, “…there are powerful practical and emotional reasons for protecting non-rational human beings, reasons which are absent in the case of most non-human animals” (Warren 401). Some of these reasons include the fact that all humans have experienced infancy and are capable of (and will likely come to experience) mental incompetence at some point in their lives (ibid). Similarly, “We don’t normally care for animals in the same way, and when we do… we may regard them as having special rights by virtue of their relationship to us” (ibid).

Her argument succeeds by avoiding such strict definitions for the prescription of moral rights. Her concession for animals that may be able to eventually communicate or to those animals we regard as having special rights (such as our pets) allow for exceptions in certain cases. She too makes the distinction that “while they do not have rights, we are, nevertheless, obligated not to be cruel to them” while recognizing Regan’s cruelty-kindness criticism.

Additional criticism may apply to her explanation for the rights of infants or the mentally deficient. It seems insufficient to imply that there are “practical and emotional reasons” for extending such rights. A speciesist could easily cite speciesism—and they would be justified. If she is presenting her argument as a postulate then it suffers as equally as Regan’s inherent value and experiencing subjects of a life argument. More could be said to substantiate this claim.

 

CONCLUSION

Singer’s speciesism is inadequate in defending animal rights since there are many cases where speciesism is not present yet discrimination can still occur. Regan’s explanation of inherent value is somewhat vague and postulates that a connection between inherent value and moral rights without identifying its natural property or defining it in positive terms. Warren’s succinct argument makes concessions where needed and uses our ability to communicate as not only the justification but also the source of moral rights. While there are compelling arguments on all sides, this is certainly not the end of the animal rights argument. More is needed to develop a comprehensive argument recognizing animal rights while understanding the role of infants and the mentally deficient.

Bibliography

 

Singer, Peter. “All Animals Are Equal” from Contemporary Moral Problems (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth Inc., 2006), pp. 379-387.

 

Regan, Tom. “The Case for Animal Rights” from Contemporary Moral Problems (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth Inc., 2006), pp. 387-396.

 

Warren, Mary Anne. “Difficulties with the Strong Animals Rights Position” from Contemporary Moral Problems (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth Inc., 2006), pp. 396-403.

 

White, James E. Contemporary Moral Problems. Thomson Wadsworth Inc., Belmont, CA, 2006. 379-403.



[1] The apartheid political system existed from 1948 to the early 1990s and prescribed that special privileges be awarded to those of European origin specifically.

[2] Her criticism benefits from responding not to the truncated article that has been reviewed for this paper but to his 400-page book of the same name. As such it should be noted that she discusses in depth some concepts that were only briefly mentioned, or were not discussed, in the shortened version.

[3] As discussed earlier—such as the Aunt Bea analogy.

April 01

The Community Compromise: Understanding the Internet’s Impact on Community and Social Relationships

This has to be one of my best essays. It's an interesting topic too: the growing industry of online communities and its impact on traditional communities and social relationships. Lots of relevant research and quality language. Overall, very top notch.


A strict linear categorization of the Internet’s impact on social communities pays injustice to its scope by either optimistically overestimating its positive impact or pessimistically overestimating its negative impact. A more appropriate understanding of the Internet with respect to social relationships formed from online communities is to say that the Internet fosters both new opportunities and challenges (Hatt 3). A fair comparison would be to view it as an evolutionary stepping-stone in the ongoing development of non-traditional communication technology—such as the telephone—rather than as a habitual anti-social catalyst—such as, some would argue, the television. Online social network communities (SNC) have developed over the past several years to comprise millions of independent users in an advanced technological community. A number of models will be examined to compare these SNC to their offline counterparts to induce why young people habitually prefer this medium. Traditional social communities (such as schools and neighbourhoods) will be examined in lieu of the Canadian social experiment called Netville and will be compared to nontraditional communities to demonstrate that the Internet works in conjunction with offline communities to foster both core and peripheral relationships that coexist. The blogosphere will also be examined as an alternative form of social community that defies conventions of bidirectional networking properties. The Internet has not necessarily improved or impaired young people’s participation in community life and social relationships; it has however supplemented and fostered a growing paradigm shift in how young people view traditional social communities.

Several definitions concerning online communities have been established to differentiate this medium from that of its offline counterpart. One such definition regards virtual communities to be “social aggregations that emerge from the Net when enough people carry on those public discussions long enough, with sufficient human feeling, to form webs of personal relationship in cyberspace” (Rheingold). This model predicates that a virtual community must bring about a long-term emotional connection in order to form a social relationship in an online space. However, common networking sites of the day (MySpace, Friendster, Facebook, Tagged, Hi5, Bebo, etc.) fail to promote this sort of community and instead focus on: (1) the perpetuated continuation of offline relationships in the online world; (2) the formation of new relationships with online individuals that may continue in the offline world; (3) the formation of new relationships with online individuals that fail to carry over into the offline world.

Several models attempt to explain the preference for such networking sites over similar offline opportunities. The first of which is the Social Presence (SP) model: “Communication media varies in the degree to which they can convey the physical presence of communicators” (Flanagin & Metzger 157). This model aligns itself on a continuum from low (simple numeric data) to high (face-to-face contact) and scores communication technology appropriately. Individuals tend to select communication means that fulfill the highest social presence. However a paradox apparently develops when individuals tend to prefer non-face-to-face communication (online) over face-to-face contact, as evidenced by the prevalence of SNCs. This can be explained by examining the preference for certain SNCs over others: Friendster was once regarding as the premiere networking site for some time before MySpace “exploded” and acquired a number of Friendster’s users (Maier). The preference here for MySpace over Friendster was the introduction of “new features” such as a larger photo depository, a more comprehensive blogging system, etc. (ibid). These technological advancements exemplify the SP model by approximating more closely the social ties that are available in the offline community. In other words, users preferred MySpace to Friendster because it could replicate the complex degree of interaction available with face-to-face contact.

The Social Influence (SI) model suggests that “it is not primarily the attributes of media that determine use, but rather such factors as assessments of needs fulfillment, appropriateness, social norms, and peer evaluations of media” (Flanagin & Metzger 157-158). This theory attempts to bridge the gap between the use of online social communities and the influence of peers in the decision-making criteria. Studies have suggested (Schmitz & Fulk, 1991) that technology use was closely correlated with close physical proximity to peers and authority figures (Flanagin & Metzger 158). In terms of student use, the prevalence of a specific online community in a student social group (i.e. a classroom, residence, club, etc.) will foster the use of that same group in other related students. Therefore the preference for an online SNC is influenced by offline affiliations, further strengthening the idea that the Internet supplements existing traditional social relationships.

A more comprehensive model called the Users and Gratifications (UG) perspective argues that “individuals [are] purposive and active” and specifies that “people select media based on needs” (Flanagin & Metzger 158). This model looks at the purposes for SNC activity and not simply the causes or preference for an online community. Studies regarding this model (Ang, 1995) have shown that users typically utilize media for “core motivations” such as information gathering, entertainment, and interaction with other similar social groups (ibid). Users thus act as autonomous agents and choose media that has the capacity to satisfy their basic needs specifically. This theory applies most easily to the scholarly study of Internet communities because it recognizes the user’s ability for independent choice without discarding the ability for technology to develop multiple uses easily. All of these models attempt to codify the dynamic between the user’s choice and the inherent complexity of Internet communication technology. It is likely that a combination of these models will provide a succinct analysis of the user’s method of choice for selecting (or preferring) an online community.

In one interesting study (Hampton & Wellman, 2000), researchers monitored a wired community outside of Toronto entitled Netville. The community was designed with free high-speed Internet installed and was developed as a study of online and offline relationships. The results are indicative of the online-offline community dynamic as whole, in that societies transitioning from rural to urban (traditional to wired) communities have nevertheless maintained strong face-to-face relationships—often bolstered by the Internet (Hampton & Wellman 195).

Individuals are much more likely to associate with people who are more like themselves in terms of lifestyle, their stage in life, beliefs, and participation in certain activities (Hampton & Wellman 202). The study reveals that while physical proximity to individuals is important in maintaining strong, ongoing relationships, the Internet can serve as a vital tool in developing these relationships initially. Netville residents at first created relationships with their direct neighbours. Over time, however, the strongest relationships were not with their direct neighbours necessarily, but with certain individuals within the community that they discovered (or built a relationship) through, through Netville’s online network. In other words, while physical proximity limits the number of individuals that can serve practically in strong long-term friendships, the Internet enables community members to easily discover those individuals with similar interests. Moreover, physical proximity continues to maintain the relationship outside of the online community by promoting the exchange of “small and large services, such as household items, aid in dealing with organizations, and help with housework and repairs” (Hampton & Wellman 202). In terms of student use, the online community enables individuals to discover information and peers with similar interests, whether due to their program of study, group affiliations, current or past residence, or other areas of interest (Das 3). The strongest relationships, as evidenced by Netville, are those that are created via online community usage that are bolstered by thriving in the offline community as well (ibid).

The blogosphere—a term used to describe the collective network of blogs, bloggers and blog readers—is another pervasive online community. Unlike other traditional online networks, this community is overarching and encompasses a number of unrelated users. This is made possible by the nature of blogs; in order to be considered a community, “it is critical that individual bloggers become aware of each other’s presence through interaction” (Lin et. al 1). However, blogs by nature promote a degree of “hidden” browsing, accomplished by unidentified users who surf and read blogs without interacting via comments or trackbacks (Lin et. al 4). Additionally, the blogosphere is defined in different terms than the traditional SNC or web community; in traditional web semantics, a hyperlink will connote a significant relationship between two pages; in blog communities however, bloggers will link to unrelated pages based on personal interest or for special comment (Lin et. al 4). Therefore a traditional community among bloggers does not necessarily form since it is a unidirectional association (ibid). This identifies a social network that is not restricted by common interests (such as communities identified by the Social Presence model) and is instead cultivated by a mutual self-identification with the blogosphere itself. It would be useful to illustrate this point by way of example: A discussion group concerning a pro-sports team will restrict the majority of conversation to group-specific material; a pro-sports blogger will write about such material, browse related blogs, comment on or trackback to related blogs, as well as browse, comment and trackback unrelated blogs. This identification with the blogosphere allows for a larger social network of multiple interests, thereby improving their participation in the online community. This also serves to improve the individual’s contacts by providing a diverse and otherwise unavailable pool of potential social relationships.

In conclusion, the Internet has served to supplement the role of social relationships and communities in the wake of the technological revolution. Indeed by providing access to like-minded individuals with a seemingly limitless number of SNCs and web-based communities, the Internet is helping to fill a gap in the social lives of a pervasive generation. Several models exist to help identify reasons for choosing an online community as opposed to face-to-face communication; these also help to understand why certain SNCs prevail while others suffer. Netville helps to exemplify how the Internet works in conjunction with traditional offline relationships to create a wider and stronger social network. Blogs are a different sort of online community that can exist when bloggers interact. It is clear that if Internet is enticing young people away from traditional social communities, then that deficit is supported by an intricate web of online supplementation.

Bibliography
Ang, I. (1995). The nature of the audience. In J. Downing, A. Mohammadi, & A.
Sreberny-Mohammadi (Eds.), Questioning the media: A critical introduction (2nd
ed., pp. 207-220). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Das, Malabika. “Public Libraries and Community Networks: Linking Futures Together?”
Aradine 22 (21 Dec. 1999): 1-7.

Flanagin, Andrew J., and Metzger, Miriam J. “Internet Use in the Contemporary Media
Envrionment.” Human Communication Research 27.1 (January 2001): 153-181.

Hampton, K.N., & Wellman, B. “Examining Community in the Digital Neighborhood:
Early Results from Canada’s Wired Suburb.” Digital Cities 1765 (2000): 194-208.

Hatt, Bertil. “Social Network Effects.” France Telecom R&D (10 Oct. 2006): 1-19.

Lin, Y., Sundaram, H., Chi, Y., Tatemura, J., Tseng, B. “Discovery of Blog Communities
based on Mutual Awareness.” Arts Media and Engineering (N.d.): 1-12.

Maier, Matthew. MySpace unwired: News Corp.’s youth-oriented Web portal extends its
influence into the wireless world. 16 Feb., 2006. Online. Feb. 2007. <http://money.cnn.com/2006/02/16/technology/business2_myspace0216/index.htm>

Rheingold, H. (2000). The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier.
The MIT Press.

Schmitz, J., & Fulk, J. (1991). Organizational colleagues, media richness, and electronic
mail: A test of the social influence model of technology use. Communication Research, 18, 487-523.



March 29

.


March 22

Admit it by Say Anything

Despite your pseudo-bohemian appearance
And vaguely leftist doctrine of beliefs
You know nothing about art or sex
That you couldn’t read in any trendy New York underground fashion magazine
Prototypical non-conformist
You are a vacuous soldier of the thrift store Gestapo
You adhere to a set of standards and tastes
That appear to be determined by an unseen panel of hipster judges (bullshit)
Giving a thumbs up or thumbs down to incoming and outgoing trends and styles of music and art
Go analog baby, you’re so post-modern
You’re diving face forward into a antiquated path
It’s disgusting, its offensive, don’t stick your nose up at me

You spend your time sitting in circles with your friends
Pontificating to each other
Forever competing for that one moment of self-aggrandizing glory
In which you hog the intellectual spotlight
Holding dominion over the entire shallow pointless conversation
Oh, we’re not worthy
When you walk by a group of quote-unquote normal people
You chuckle to yourself patting yourself on the back as you scoff
It's the same superiority complex
Shared by the high school jocks who made your life a living hell
And makes you a slave to the competitive capitalist dogma
You spend every moment of your waking life bitching about

Well let me tell you this, I am shamelessly self-involved
I spend hours in front of the mirror, making my hair elegantly disheveled
I worry about how this album will sell
Because I believe it will determine the amount of sex I will have in the future
I self medicate with drugs and alcohol to treat my extreme social anxiety
Say Anything

Masculine Femininity: Gender reversals in Rear Window and Written On The Wind

I'm very happy with this essay because it marks a departure from that formulaic nonsense I've been submitting to since I got here. I don't think there's any filler whatsoever (except maybe in the conclusion...) and that's quite the achievement for a 9-page essay.


While a surface reading of Rear Window (1952) presents a conventional Hitchcock mystery-thriller, it is in fact a complex allegory concerning questions of gender, sexuality, and the misunderstood (perhaps overrated) virtues of marriage during the post-War masculinity crisis. By the same token, Written on the Wind (1954) offers a whimsical love fantasy couched in classical Hollywood melodrama, but at the same time subverts these conventions in the service of similar gender complications. This paper will approach gender in a specific and prudent manner to expose gender reversals present in these two texts. Gender is established by an interaction between individuals; sociocultural expectations determine “appropriate” actions for males and females, labeled as “masculine” and “feminine.” Included in this essay will be an analysis of mise-en-scene elements, characterization, as well as close scene analyses of both films to illuminate these gender role reversals. Lucy Moore and Lisa Fremont have similar trajectories in these films: they are at first presented as the new women in the workforce, and are then subsequently domesticated via the male influence. The role of female sexuality is also questioned in relation to the growing sexual revolution and female sexual liberation during this time. This essay will compare as well as contrast Rear Window and Written on the Wind to prove that there are significant gender role reversals for female characters in these films.

 

Lucy and Lisa share similar character traits that are indicative of both gender reversals and the rise of women in the workforce. There is a great deal of emphasis on costume in both of these films, as evidenced by Sirk’s habitual use of primary colours to further dramaticize the aesthetic of his films and Hitchcock’s unrelenting preparation and planning (Fischer 223; Berry 79).  According to Grace Kelly, “Every costume was indicated when he sent me the script. There was a reason for every color, every style, and he was absolutely certain about everything he settled on” (Berry 79). Lisa’s first scene is a playful courtship between her and Jeffries where she presents herself as youthful and sexually enticing. Here, her femininity is undermined by her actual gender characterization—a sort of “social projection” that serves to present one reality when in fact the opposite is true (Berry 80). In this first scene, Lisa discusses her dress and moves about Jeff’s apartment with coy flirtatiousness; however, a closer reading of her actions reveals that rather than modeling the dress, she has an economic investment in its marketability—she is more businesswoman than runway model. She asks of Jeff, “Do you think it’ll sell?” After a long-winded mocking reply from Jeff, she quips, “A steal at $1,100,” followed by, “We sell a dozen a day in this price range.” In a later conversation she reveals that she “was all morning in a meeting” and that she is “trying to get (Leland Hayward’s) new show.” While Lisa is presented as stereotypically feminine—concerned only with fashion culture—her personal life is in fact quite masculine—concerned with the fashion industry, capitalism and profitability (Lemire 68). Nevertheless, she actively conforms to social conventions, as evidenced by her response to Jeff’s question, “Is this the Lisa Fremont who never wears the same dress twice?” she admits, “Only because it’s expected of her.” These gender roles are complicated even further by the contrast between Jeff, who is forced to adopt the feminized position at home while Lisa adopts the masculine role of breadwinner (Lemire 69).

 

By the end of the film, Lisa wears jeans and reads a travel magazine, insinuating that her outward appearance comes to coincide with her internalized masculinity. Some critics note that since she picks up a Harper’s Bazaar fashion magazine, she has residual unresolved femininity (Fawell 52). However this can be explained through her business relationship with the publication, as she says, “I had to go to ‘21’ and have lunch with the Harper's Bazaar people” (ibid). Hitchcock never explicitly allows her masculinity to be foregrounded; instead, he chooses to articulate these differences through illusory actions, hinting at a more complex Lisa Fremont than the audience may anticipate (Taylor 223).

 

The same can be said for Lucy Moore, who experiences a career devolution from Executive Secretary to Housewife. This development is expressed through her wardrobe, again employing a sort of double (or hidden) identity. In her introductory scene, the camera begins ambiguously on a desk only to tilt upwards and reveal Lucy in her office. She wears a white blouse and knee-length skirt. As she prepares seemingly important marketing material, her status here is largely masculine: in a large windowed office, without another male present, she commands the space freely without any notion of social conformity. A reversion occurs when Mitch Wayne enters the room—his gaze re-feminizes Lucy. The camera adopts Mitch’s point of view after he notices Lucy’s legs, which are clearly framed by the poster stands and visible due of the choice of wardrobe. Lucy has become objectified in the eyes of the male gaze (as well as the spectators’ gaze by implication) by focusing on one part of the female body.

 

This objectification is also the source of Lucy’s duality. She is a businesswoman in a skirt instead of trousers: a visual cue to her femininity—her objectification—regardless of her workplace authority. This continues through later contradiction, where at one time she does “everything but wipe windshields,” and only a short time later leaves her career for marriage without much consideration. (At least, the audience is not privy to her decision-making; the choice between marriage and a career appears to the audience as no choice at all). This confirms the fact that such reconfigurations will “give way within the Hollywood narrative to a love story” wherever the two conflict (MacKinnon 128).

 

Similar to Lisa, Lucy is a businesswoman at her core, but adjusts her appearance to accommodate social norms—she feminizes her appearance to compensate for the masculinity of her true professional aspirations (Belton 78). Later in the film, after marriage and the inherent domestification that comes along with marriage, Lucy has visually changed. Now her concern is motherhood, marriage and similar traditional feminine values. She is shown in a pure green head-to-toe-length dress, effectively covering her entire body. No longer is the audience awarded a glimpse of her legs—it is now impossible for the audience to objectify her, and no character is granted a point-of-view objectifying gaze as seen earlier. Through conformity to the institution of marriage, Lucy is robbed of her femininity and has instead replaced it with a desexualized, defeminized appearance. Her concentration on the well-being of her marriage and her eventual pregnancy show a stark reversal from the beginning: from masculinized business-oriented motivation with a feminized appearance, to a feminized family-oriented motivation but a de-gendered appearance. Unlike Hitchcock, Sirk must adhere to a screenplay he did not design and a system in which he has little freedom; therefore, by attending to wardrobe differences, he is able to insert these gender questions into a film following otherwise generic conventions (Harvey 223).

 

These films concern themselves with the sexual presence of the female characters and how a woman’s sexuality, especially the overt, is unrewarded or even punished. Although this topic does discuss sexuality, it remains a gender issue due to the sociocultural norms that dictate whether such sexual behaviour is suitable for the particular gender. Until the ‘50s, female sexuality was typically taboo, largely considered aberrant and not suitable for public discussion or display (Belton 76). Dr. Alfred Kinsey changed many of these stereotypes by demystifying traditional gender roles, which influenced the beginning of a sexual revolution (ibid). These two films, however, seem to perpetuate many of the traditional conformist attitudes about female sexuality, in lieu or in spite of changing gender roles.

 

When Doyle enters the apartment, Hitchcock allows for a number of shots concerning Lisa’s overnight bag—a symbol of her blunt sexuality—that is displayed openly and filled with various lingerie (Belton 77). There are seven consecutive shots in the sequence, all without dialogue: (1) the camera follows Doyle to the coffee table, he hears Lisa humming from the kitchen, he looks upwards at her shadow; (2) a point-of-view shot looking at the shadow; (3) a reaction shot of Jeff, looking somewhat concerned, watching both Doyle and the shadow; (4) a similar shot of Doyle again as he looks down from the shadow, somewhat apprehensive, and lights his cigarette while looking at the table; (5) a second point-of-view shot looking at the lingerie on the table; (6) a second reaction shot of Jeff looking at the lingerie then back up at Doyle; (7) the same shot of Doyle as he looks up at Jeff, then lights his cigarette.

 

The fact that Doyle is awarded not one, but two point-of-view shots in a film where perspective is an important screen commodity speaks to the importance of this sequence in a seemingly inconsequential series of shots serving no narrative purpose. There are also two reaction shots of Jeff, without dialogue, looking slightly apprehensive himself, speaking to Jeff’s own concern about how he may be perceived. Both men are engaging in an unspoken agreement about the inappropriate nature of Lisa’s advances. The nature of her sexuality is traditionally delegated to the male (masculine) characters and the female (feminine) characters are largely passive, if not submissive (Mulvey 11). Here we see the inversion of this gender model, with Lisa providing the sexual advances and Jeff acting passively towards them. It is only later in the film, when Lisa begins to take a more active role in the film’s narrative (the male position), that Jeff begins to see her as sexually enticing (eliciting the male gaze). This can again be attributed to a gender reversal, as it is commonly the male characters that serve to advance the plot. It is impossible for Jeff to cross the courtyard and enter Thorwald’s apartment, so Lisa adopts the masculine position and advances the plot as necessary, building their sexual relationship along with it. This attraction comes in tandem with Lisa entering the voyeuristic space, which Jeff comes to fetishize. However, Hitchcock withholds Jeff’s reaction shot—his look of infatuation, his gaze—until Lisa returns to the apartment, filled with palpable excitement over her adventure. It would be prudent here to note that this is the commencement of Jeff’s re-masculinization, employing the male gaze towards Lisa for the first time, now seeing her as sexually attractive. 

 

Mary Lee parallels Lisa in her sexual advances, although Mary Lee’s are more openly sexual, and more overtly punished. She has much in common with her brother, Rick Hadley, in the way she deals with the opposite sex in issues like love and marriage—furthering her masculinzed characterization. Against female conventions, especially for this period, she has little regard for the institution of marriage. She degrades Lucy’s union to Rick, remarking, “About your marriage, you have my condolences.” Earlier in a conversation with Mitch, she pleads, “I’ll wait, and I’ll have you. Marriage, or no marriage.” Her interest in sexual satisfaction, in spite of Mitch’s impassive attitude, leads her to the arms of several other men in an attempt to make him jealous. She is ‘rescued’ at first from the bar, and is later ‘rescued’ once again from the motel by police officers. The latter instance is the source of her first punishment—the death of her father. After Jasper Hadley is told that Mary Lee is a well-known “whore,” he proceeds up the stairs to confront her. But as she dances the “dance of a dead woman” in her room, her father collapses (Burkell 82). He dies “because he’s guilty,” or at least he believes he is guilty for his daughters petulant sexuality (ibid). This perhaps serves best to illustrate the perpetuated feminine stereotypes in the film; her brother is an open womanizer at the onset, encompassing many of the same attitudes as his sister, but he is never regarded poorly for his sexuality. In other words, it is appropriate for a man to be sexually affluent, but a woman is a “whore” by the same action. In fact, Rick’s pursuit of Lucy for mere “play” is eventually rewarded with marriage.

 

After Mary Lee alludes to an adulterous affair between Mitch and Lucy, Rick begins a downward path towards his eventual death—Mary Lee’s second punishment. Now she is without family and left with the Hadley Corporation and a great deal of responsibility. At the end of the film, she sits at her father’s desk with the oilrig in hand. This is her final punishment—the death of her own sexuality. The oilrig symbolizes a phallic substitute, a symbol of both power and responsibility, which has been used by Jasper throughout the film (Fischer 225). Jasper is largely de-masculinized through his lack of power and control over his children and employs a surrogate phallus to compensate for this deficit. Revealed in the final shot is the new Mary Lee: her once overt masculinated sexuality has been replaced with the interests of the Hadley Corporation. Physically destitute in the world, much in the way her father was emotionally alone, she now employs the very same phallic substitute her father used to compensate for lack of power. At one time she could devote her time to her sexual gratification; now she must see to the interests of business and professional sustainability. In essence, she is the new Lucy Moore.

 

Both of these films utilize gender reversals to complicate traditional ideals of masculine and feminine characters. These complications are certainly in response to the status of men in post-War America (Berry 82). After returning home, men sought to reclaim their professions and spearheaded a cultural movement beckoning women back to their homes. Hitchcock and Sirk were in a position to comment on this social conflict and did so with subversion and subtlety in both Rear Window and Written on the Wind. Primarily, they made use of costuming to communicate the duality of their female protagonists. These women desired a professional career but had to conform to cultural norms in order to appear feminine and to avoid a misunderstood masculinity. Sexuality was also a matter of concern in these films, as women faced a sexual liberation on one hand and continued male idealism, traditionalism and domination on the other. These characters experienced a degree of punishment for their open sexuality, whether subtle or overt. Written on the Wind upholds traditional gender roles on the surface while subverting these very conventions through narrative and technical processes; Rear Window seeks to disrupt the very same conventions in an equally subtle manner. Both films, however, offer a compelling criticism on this critical period, capturing the zeitgeist of the American gender revolution.

Works Cited

 

Belton, John, ed. Alfred Hitchcock’s Rear Window. Cambridge, UK: University of

Cambridge Press, 2000.

 

Berry, Sarah. “‘She's Too Everything’: Marriage and Masquerade in ‘Rear Window’ and

            ‘To Catch a Thief.’” Hitchcock Annual (2002): 80-105.

 

Burkel, Ernst. Interview with Douglas Sirk and Rainer Wener Fassbinder. “Reacting to

What You Experience.” The Anarchy of the Imagination: Interviews, Essays, Notes. Lensing, Leo A., and Toteberg, Michael, eds. Baltimore, Maryland: The Jons Hopkins University Press, 1992.

 

Fawell, John. “Jeff, Hitchcock’s Emasculated Hero.” Hitchcock’s Rear Window: The

Well-Made Film. Ed. John Fawell. United States of America: Library of Congress, 1959.

 

Fischer, Lucy, ed. Imitation of Life. United States of America: Rutgers Films in Print,

1991.

 

Lemire, Elise. ''Voyeurism and the Postwar Crisis of Masculinity in Rear Window.''

Alfred Hitchcock's Rear Window. Ed. John Belton. Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge Press, 2000.

 

MacKinnon, Kenneth. “Male Spectatorship and the Hollywood Love Story.” Journal of

Gender Studies 12.2 (2004).

 

Mulvey, Laura. “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema.” Screen 16.3 (Autumn 1974): 6-

18.

 

Taylor, John Russell. Hitch: The Life and Work of Alfred Hitchcock. London, UK: Faber

and Faber, 1978.

 

Harvey, James. Interview with Douglas Sirk. “Sirkumstantial Evidence.” Imitation of

Life: Douglas Sirk, dir. Ed. Lucy Fischer. United States of America: Rutgers Films in Print, 1991.

Works Consulted


Berry, Sarah. “‘She's Too Everything’: Marriage and Masquerade in ‘Rear Window’ and

‘To Catch a Thief.’” Hitchcock Annual (2002): 80-105.

 

Blazer, Seth M. “Rear Window Ethics: Domestic Privacy versus Public Responsibility in

the Evolution of Voyeurism.” The Midwest Quarterly 47.4 (Summer 2006): 379-394.

 

Camper, Fred. “The Films of Douglas Sirk.” Imitation of Life: Douglas Sirk, dir. Ed.

Lucy Fischer. United States of America: Rutgers Films in Print, 1991.

 

Fischer, Lucy, ed. Imitation of Life. United States of America: Rutgers Films in Print,

1991.

 

Halliday, Jon. “Sirk on Sirk.” Imitation of Life: Douglas Sirk, dir. Ed. Lucy Fischer.

United States of America: Rutgers Films in Print, 1991.

           

Hemmeter, Thomas. “Horror Behind the Camera: Cultural Sources of Violence in

Hitchcock's Mid-Century America.” Post Script – Essays in Film and the Humanities 22.2 (Winter 2002-Spring 2003): 7-19.

 

Higham, Charles. “Hitchcock’s World.” Film Quarterly 16.2 (Winter 162-1963): 3-16.

 

Klinger, Barbara. Melodrama and Meaning: History, Culture, and the Films of Douglas

Sirk. The United States of America: Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data, 1994.

 

Lensing, Leo A., and Toteberg, Michael, eds. The Anarchy of the Imagination:

Interviews, Essays, Notes. Baltimore, Maryland: The Jons Hopkins University Press, 1992.

 

Steffen-Fluhr, Nancy. “Disabled by Desire: Body Doubles in ‘Rear Window’ (1942),

‘Rear Window’ (1954), and ‘Rear Window’ (1998).” Post Script - Essays in Film and the Humanities 22.3 (Summer 2003): 69-88.

 

Wylie, Matt. “Avoiding the Masculine ‘Gaze’: Frustrated Homosexual Desire and the

Eroticized Role of the Camera In Hitchcock’s Rear Window and Antonioni’s Blow Up.” CineText (2003).

 

March 18

.


March 08

“We Have No King But (Law)”



 
The term “fundamentalism” is most often applied pejoratively to Islamic radicals and Eastern religious fundamentalists who believe that other religions, and even other Muslims, are unequivocally wrong in their beliefs; fundamentalists argue that their version of God is the only acceptable truth. Moreover, fundamentalists believe that the state should act upon these infallible beliefs, often claiming that the nation was formed because of, or in spirit of, these values. However, the term itself originated from the World Christian Fundamentals Association, formed in the United States in 1918 (Feldman 135). This group produced a series of pamphlet-sized paperbacks designed to codify the “fundamentals” of Christian values in an age of increasing tolerance and progressive liberalism (ibid). This document, collectively entitled The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth, spawned a resurgence in Christian nationalism, and a movement called Fundamentalist Christianity, that continues to influence the political culture of the United States. Benefiting from, and related to, this resurgence are Evangelicals, an increasingly large group of born-again Christian radicals and self-identified fundamentalists. These Christians follow the same core beliefs set out in The Fundamentals but are more organized than Fundamentalist groups and are developing tremendous influence in the political atmosphere within the United States. While Eastern Islamic fundamentalism has been relentlessly reported in the news media, the scope of this paper shall focus on Fundamentalist Christians and Evangelicals within the United States specifically. This will ensure a relevant, decisively prudent exposition of this topic at a crucial point in global politics. First, fundamentalism’s incompatibility with constitutional principles like the separation of Church and State and the First Amendment will be examined. Second, the influence of Fundamentalist Christians and Evangelicals within the United States’ political system will be examined to reveal the Religious Right’s growing agenda and influence. Finally, policy and legislative initiatives championed by fundamentalist organizations will be discussed to reveal how the implementation of these bills, and indeed their very nature, are incompatible with the United States political system. Fundamentalist Christianity is incompatible with the principles of the United States Constitution and the concept of a free liberal democracy therein.

Although the United States Constitution clearly establishes the role of the State and religion, Fundamentalist Christians continue to advocate an alternative and dangerous interpretation. To be sure, many mainstream Christian organizations rally for the integration of Church and State. However, Fundamentalists and Evangelicals are traditionally known to be the strongest of such advocates, as evidenced by their radical take on the infallible word of God

One popular notion about the United States is that it was formed as “one nation under god,” and has since been corrupted into a godless state (Levy 142). However, the Framers of the Constitution in fact created “a godless federal constitutional structure, which was then undermined as God entered” political and social discourse (Levy 143). The Framers failed to mention God in the constitution—a notably deliberate omission meant to promote the separation of Church and State. Religion is addressed within the Constitution in the form of the First Amendment. It reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof” (Cornell Law School). This sense of reverence for the exercise of religion follows with the idea that it is a choice of personal conscience and should neither be promoted nor inhibited by the government. Regardless of the interpretation one infers of the First Amendment, it can be empirically stated that the Framers valued freedom of conscience—the principle of choice—above the security of religion as supported by the government. Jefferson himself argued for the freedom of conscience when he said, "it does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg" (Peterson 284-285).

By contrast, a notable defense posited by pro-integrationists regarding the Church-State relationship is to note that this was not explicitly written in to the Constitution itself. Jefferson coined the term in a letter to the Danbury Baptist Association. The paragraph in question reads as follows:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between Man & his God… I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between Church & State. (The Library of Congress)

In addition to providing a more concise explanation of the First Amendment, this quotation serves as a written testament to the constitutional convention that Jefferson intended to establish. Indeed the presence of “separation between Church & State” within the constitution cannot be disputed, but political scientists have long understood the role of customs and conventions in the political system. With that in mind, it can be reasoned that this letter marked a seminal point in the State-Church relationship, which prevails (albeit not without challenge) to this day. Keeping with the Constitution’s concern over the freedom of conscience, Jefferson continues to argue that “adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation (is) in behalf of the rights of conscience” (ibid).
Undermining these founding principles, the words “In God We Trust” appeared on currency in 1863 as a result of increased religious sentiment during the Civil War, as well as a series of letters to the Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase (Department of the Treasury). One such letter asked, “What if our Republic were not shattered beyond reconstruction? Would not the antiquaries of succeeding centuries rightly reason from our past that we were a heathen nation?” (ibid). Without a federal debate, referendum or court ruling, currency was altered in the United States to reflect the beliefs of these Christian Americans. This occurred nearly 100 years after the Constitution was established and ratified. This was no more ‘the will of the people’ than it was a deliberate attack on the Constitutional principles in order to realign national religious sentiment to meet that of a select few individuals.

The word “God” also entered federal mail service in 1912 and once again with the Pledge of Allegiance in 1954 (Levy 143). The Pledge is perhaps the most cited document concerning this issue and Fundamentalists seeking to ‘reunite’ the Christian God with the U.S. government frequently use the phrase “one nation under god” (Brasher XV). However, this phrase appears almost 200 years after the United States Constitution was established and ratified, making it an effective alteration to the founding principles—rather than a tribute to them. After a number of these alterations, “God” slowly began to infiltrate national discourse until the prevailing notion among Fundamentalist Christians was that the United States not only exists as “one nation under God,” but was in fact created as such (Brasher XVI). Altogether, it is clear that the trend of political culture in the United States is one of a godless constitution, which gradually awarded special recognition to Christianity throughout the years, culminating with the Pledge of Allegiance in 1954. These alterations not only undermine the intended status of religion within the United States, but also dishonour the intentions of the Framers of the Constitution. In a letter to the Cardinal, one writer addressed this issue by saying, “It is not the function of civil law to prescribe everything that is morally right and to forbid everything that is morally wrong… (these) lie beyond the scope of law; they are left to the personal conscience” (Murray). The integration of Church and State is but one initiative supported by Fundamentalist Christians and Evangelicals in the United States today.

The second point of this paper will focus on evaluating the influence of Fundamentalism within the United States to reveal a growing number of subversive initiatives, appointments and nominations. Oftentimes, when not satisfied with the direction of popular politics, Evangelicals have lobbied for appointments for individuals with agreeable religious convictions (Feldman 14). Ted Haggard, former president of the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE), publicly supported the Religious Right in their efforts to seek suitable judicial appointments. While preaching to the New Life Church, a 14,000-member church in Colorado Springs, Haggard frequently discussed political issues. During a sermon he said, “We pray for President Bush as he’s preparing to elect a new Supreme Court nominee” (Jesus Camp 1:06:35). The nominee to whom he refers is Judge Samuel Alito, who was later confirmed with a 58-42 vote in Congress. The narrow confirmation certainly reflects the nation’s division over the Judge, who received strong support from conservative groups but equal opposition from civil-rights groups (Marus 12). Weighing in on the importance of the appointment to the Religious Right, Reverend Jerry Falwell, an Evangelical pastor and televangelist, said during a public address:
This is a crucial, crucial time. What we worked on for 30 years is coming to culmination, to consummation right now… Get on the telephone, write your letter, get to your U.S. senators, and let’s confirm this man, Judge Alito, to the U.S. Supreme Court. And let’s make one more step towards bringing America back to one nation under God. God bless you. (Conn)

Similarly, from 2001-2005, Attorney General John Ashcroft championed and supported legislation that aligned with his personal Fundamentalist religious convictions (Girsch 33). In 1999, Ashcroft gave a speech to Bob Jones University, a Protestant Fundamentalist institution in South Carolina, outlining his view of the United States:
Unique among the nations, America recognized the source of our character as being godly and eternal, not being civic and temporal. And because we have understood that our source is eternal, America has been different. We have no king but Jesus. (Ashcroft)

Ashcroft’s strong views on “the church-state issue and many others disqualified him for the role of the nation’s chief law enforcement officer” in the eyes of many Americans and Senate members (Church & State 13). Nevertheless, both the Evangelicals and Ashcroft continued to develop “their own innovative legal strategy, depicting religious people as a persecuted minority in need of the courts’ protection” (Feldman 14).

Continually, the NAE lends their name to legal cases that concern religious and moral legal questions. One such case was Carhart v. Ashcroft, a case involving the controversial Ban on Partial Birth Abortion Act. The Act effectively eliminates the medical process that makes available abortions for any woman in her second trimester. In an appeal, U.S. District Judge Richard Kopf concluded that:
The overwhelming weight of the trial evidence proves that the banned procedure is safe and medically necessary in order to preserve the health of women under certain circumstances. In the absence of an exception for the health of a woman, banning the procedure constitutes a significant health hazard to the woman. (Center for Reproductive Rights)

The NAE joined the Christian Legal Society in writing a brief to uphold the Act, regardless of the “overwhelming weight of the trial evidence” that support an alteration or altogether eradication of the Act (NAE). This also points to the stagnant position of Fundamentalist Christians in the sense that they are unwavering in their convictions and beliefs. Haggard spoke to these rigid beliefs when he said, “We don’t have to have a general assembly about what we believe—it’s written in the Bible. So we don’t have to debate about what we should think about [moral questions]—it’s written in the Bible” (St. Philip’s Anglican Church 5).

    It should be made clear that it remains acceptable for pressure groups, including Fundamentalist Christians, to have a voice in political discourse. However, it is not acceptable for a pressure group to either infiltrate the political system to further their agendas, or for government to make special arrangements to satisfy these groups. It is also impermissible to make a federal recognition of any particular religious figure. This is both the essential principle behind the separation between Church and State as well a fundamental part of America’s free liberal democracy. Perhaps the most important indication of the amount of influence that Fundamentalist Christians have within the United States—as well as a humbling indication of the urgency of this situation—is identified when Haggard identifies the Evangelical Church as “an awful lot of people, and we’re growing… It’s got enough growth to essentially sway every election. If the Evangelicals vote, they determine the election” (Jesus Camp 1:07:09).

    Lastly this paper will examine certain initiatives that are incompatible with the United States political system as outlined thus far. American Fundamentalist Christians are concerned with moral issues and life questions concerning the legality of abortion. In 1994, a Vatican official argued that the Vatican could not support “any concept of ‘reproductive rights’ that includes abortion or an internationally recognized fundamental right to abortion” (Women Against Fundamentalism). Participants on either side of the abortion debate have often conceded that any person holding an unchallengeable ban on, or endorsement of, abortion are said to hold an “extreme view” (Thomson 106). Times when anti-abortionists “won’t even make an exception for a case in which continuation of the pregnancy is likely to shorten the mother’s life” are “nowadays very rare, and many opponents of abortion do not accept this extreme view” (ibid). However, current political discourse concerning the abortion debate has many “extremists” participating in what they see as a moral crusade for Christianity, advocating a position that aligns with their beliefs (Women Against Fundamentalism). Evangelicals have formed a Right-to-Life coalition to lobby against abortion throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and continuing today (ibid). These groups maintain that an abortion should not be permitted in any case—even rape (National Right to Life).  While these individuals are certainly free to uphold their convictions in private, appropriating this view on a nation-wide scale would “increase stress on women, greatly diminish their freedom of conscience, and accelerate population growth, resource depletion, and environmental deterioration” (Edd 45). As noted earlier, the Constitution concerns itself greatly with freedom of conscience. The Fundamentalist view on issues like abortion directly conflict with this founding principle and should therefore be independent from federal legislation.

    Fundamentalists also seek recognized tax incentives for sectarian private schools and their families within the United States (Edd 45). One such recent initiative involves providing tax credits for parents who pay for private school tuition in New York (Karlin). While advocates of the credit cite an improved freedom of choice, opponents argue that it would “undercut the public school system” because public money would be routed to fund private school initiatives (ibid). This conflicts again with the separation of Church and State, authorizing public tax dollars to fund a preference for religious education. These small initiatives are the first step in “a shift of students from publicly controlled common schools to discriminatory private schools where sectarian indoctrination takes precedence over academic freedom” (Edd 45). Indeed this shift has already begun, with Evangelical Children’s Pastors across the country administrating indoctrination camps for children as young as five years old. One such Pastor from North Dakota defended her indoctrination by arguing, “The reason you go for kids is because whatever they learn by the time they’re seven, eight, nine years old is pretty well there for the rest of their lives… You can call it brainwashing, but I am radical and passionate about teaching children about their responsibly as Christians, as God-fearing people, and as Americans” (Jesus Camp 1:15:32). Although indoctrination is not a legislative issue, creating tax incentives for Fundamentalist private schools vis-à-vis special recognition by federal or state law is a point of contention.  As identified, the separation of Church and State makes such endorsements unconstitutional and are thus fairly identified as a threat to the American political system.

    The Fundamentalist Christian movement is inherently incompatible with the United States political system. The Constitution describes the degree to which the state can interfere in religious activities; it is this distinction that makes the advancement of Fundamentalist initiatives in politics an unconstitutional practice. The First Amendment was designed to protect the freedom of conscience and this freedom has been compromised by Fundamentalism in recent years. The influence of Fundamentalist Christians was revealed to show a growing agenda supporting extremist initiatives. Certain key individuals like John Ashcroft have been appointed to positions that compromise the Church-State separation. The words of former NAE President Ted Haggard reveal the growing influence of Evangelical fundamentalists within the United States. Finally, certain policy initiatives revealed the incompatibility of the Fundamentalist position within the realm of political discourse. The inflexible and extremist stance on abortion, tax incentives and government aid all point to unpredictable population growth and resource depletion. The extreme beliefs of Fundamentalist Christians are themselves not an issue, but any attempt by such sectarian groups to infiltrate politics is cause for alarm. As Fundamentalist author D. James Kennedy writes most disturbingly, “This is our land. This is our world. This is our heritage, and with God’s help, we shall reclaim this nation for Jesus Christ. And no power on earth can stop us”  (Kennedy 7-8).

 
Bibliography

Ashcroft, John. John Ashcroft’s Speech at Bob Jones University. Feb. 2001. Online. Feb.
2007 <http://www.spectacle.org/0201/ashcroft.html>.

Karlin, Rick. “Private school tax break debated.” Times Union (2 Feb. 2007). Online.
Mar.  2007 <http://timesunion.com/AspStories/story.asp?storyID=
559693&category=FRONTPG&BCCode=HOME&newsdate=2/2/2007>.

Brasher, Brenda E. Encyclopedia of Fundamentalism. New York, NY: Berkshire, 2001.

Center for Reproductive Rights. Key Quotes from the Courts: 2004 Trial in the 8th
District. N.d. Online. Feb. 2007 <http://www.crlp.org/crt_pba_KeyQuotes.html>.

Church & State. “President George Bush and the Separation of Church and State.”
Church & State 54.2 (Feb 2001): 13.

Conn, Joseph L. “Alleluia For Alito?: Religious Right Pushes Bush’s Court Nominee At
Philly Church Event.” Americans United: For Separation of Church and State (9 Jan. 2006). Online. Feb 2007 <http://blog.au.org/2006/01/09/alleluia_for_al/>.

Cornell Law School. United States Constitution: Bill of Rights. N.d. Online. Feb. 2007
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.billofrights.html>.

Feldman, Noah. Divided by God: America’s Church-State Problem—and what we should
do about it. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux Books, 2005.

Danforth, John C. “The Values Divide.” U.S. News & World Report (15 Jan. 2007): N.p.

Department of the Treasury. Fact Sheets: Currency & Coins – History of ‘In God We
Trust’. Nd. Online. Feb. 2007 <http://www.treas.gov/education/fact-
sheets/currency/in-god-we-trust.shtml>.

Edd, Doerr. “Church and State: Pulling It All Together.” The Humanist 49.2 (Mar. 1989):
45.

Girsch, Faye. “Ashcroft, Eastwood, and assisted dying.” Humanist 65.3 (May/June
2005): 33-34.

Greenberg, Anna. “The Church and the Revitalization of Politics and Community.”
Political Science Quarterly 115.3 (3 Nov. 2000): 377-394.

Jesus Camp. Prod., Dir. Heidi Ewing and Rachel Grady. DVD. A&E Indie Films, 2006.

Kennedy, D. James, & Black, Jim Nelson. Character & Destiny: A Nation In Search of
Its Soul. Zondervan Publishing House, 1997.

Levy, Leonard W. “The Case for Religious Incorrectness.” Reviews in American History
24.4 (1995): 141-145.

Library of Congress, The. Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists. 1 Jan. 1802. Online.
Feb. 2007 <http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html>.

Marus, Robert. “Alito confirmation reflects national divisions.” The Christian Century 123.4 (21 Feb.
    2006): 12.
   
Mews, Stuart. Religion in Politics: A World Guide. Essex, UK: Longman Group UK Ltd,
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Murray, John Courtney. “Memo to Cardinal Cushing on Contraception Legislation.”
Works By John Courtney Murray, S.J. N.d. Online. Feb. 2007 <http://woodstock.
georgetown.edu/library/Murray/1965F.htm>.

National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) . Court Cases. N.d. Online. Feb. 2007
<http://www.nae.net/index.cfm?FUSEACTION=editor.page&pageID=130&idCategory=8>.

National Right to Life. What is the pro-life response to abortionists’ arguments? N.d.
Online. Feb. 2007 <http://www.nrlc.org/abortion/facts/abortionresponses.html>.

Neem, Johann N. “One Nation Under Law: America’s Early National Struggles to
Separate Church and State, and: The Founders on God and Government.” Journal
of the Early Republic 26.2 (2006): 333-338.

Peterson, Merrill D. “Thomas Jefferson: Writings.” Notes on the State of Virginia (1984):
284-285.
 
St. Philip’s Anglican Church. Two Ways of Being. 21 Jan. 2007. Online. Feb. 2007.
<www.stphilips.bc.ca/Sermons/2007.01.21.doc>.

Stassen, Glen. “Back to Jesus’ way.” Sojourners 29.6 (Nov/Dec 2000): 14.

Dyck, Rand. Studying Politics: An Introduction to Political Science. Thomson Nelson,
2002.

Thomson, Judith Jarvis. “A Defense of Abortion.” Philosophy & Public Affairs.
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Tremblay, R.C., Lecours, A., Nikolenyi, C., Salloukh, B., & Scala, F. Mapping the
Political Landscape: An Introduction to Political Science. Thomson Nelson, 2004.

Women Against Fundamentalism. Religious fundamentalism and sexual and
reproductive rights. N.d. Online. Feb. 2007 <http://waf.gn.apc.org/fact3.htm>.

February 21

In Support of Abortion



   
    The purpose of this paper is to argue that abortion is morally permissible. This will be shown by first addressing Judith Thomson’s fine paper, “A Defense of Abortion.” Even after granting that a fetus is a person from conception (for argument’s sake), she maintains that abortion is permissible in most circumstances by way of a “famous violinist” analogy. Secondly, Mary Anne Warren continues with Thomson’s argument in her article entitled, “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion.” She contests that Thomson’s “famous violinist” analogy does little to justify abortion in cases where rape was not the cause. She introduces the idea of moral community and the criterion for personhood as an alternative justification. Finally, and in opposition to the previous two articles, Don Marquis argues against abortion in his paper entitled “An Argument that Abortion is Wrong.” He suggests that the reason we find killing impermissible is that a shortened life deprives others of a “future like ours” (FLO). His compelling argument succeeds in eliminating the impasse found in the rights-based arguments, but still fails in light of the fetus’ status, as I will show. Rebuttals from all authors will be brought forth to contest the points made here. This will serve to unequivocally prove that while there are excellent arguments on both sides, abortion is still morally permissible, in most cases.

    It should be said that the words “in most cases” are included because the issue of abortion lends itself to exception. It is an issue of exceeding complexity and different situations may dictate different courses of action. It is fair to say that anyone supporting one side completely—that is, “abortion is always wrong” or “abortion is never wrong”—could be said to hold an extreme view. Those who acknowledge the difficulty in the situation and make exceptions where appropriate are typically those who offer the most intellectual arguments.

THE VIOLINIST & PLANNED PREGNANCY
    Thomson’s “famous violinist” analogy is a strong example of how abortion is morally permissible. In summary, the analogy is as follows: a third party kidnaps you and you wake up attached to a famous violinist. You are told that detaching yourself would kill him, as he is using your kidneys to stay alive. Thomson argues that you are free to detach yourself on the grounds that the violinist has no right to the use of your body. The logic follows that if you agree with this analogy, then you agree with abortion in cases of rape.

    Thomson continues this line of thought with a later analogy involving the cool touch of Henry Fonda’s hand to her brow as a cure for an unnamed ailment. This succeeds in addressing her point about rights more directly. As she says, “It would be frightfully nice of him to fly from the West Coast to provide it… But I have no right at all against anybody that he should do this for me” (Thomson 109). The logic follows that while the fetus has a right to life (only granted due to Thomson’s earlier premise), that right does not involve “a right to be given the use of or a right to be allowed continued use of another person’s body” (ibid).

    Warren agrees in her paper that the violinist analogy is plausible and in the cases of rape, “it is probably conclusive” (Thomson 117). But as a point of contention she suggests that when making the case for “a woman who becomes pregnant intentionally” (ibid) or fails to use available contraception, for example, it becomes difficult to justify abortion on the basis of Thomson’s argument. She rightly points out that Thomson ignores the responsibility of the mother for her own pregnancy and that the violinist analogy only seems to apply to rape.

    It does become complicated here to conclude, based on Thomson’s argument, that abortion is as morally permissible in situations where the mother intended to get pregnant. Based on one distinction, Thomsonian theorists may argue that abortion is impermissible here because it falls under Thomson’s “Minimally Samaritanism.” But Thomson describes this as a situation where, for example, a mother decides to abort in the seventh month because she wants to go on a skiing vacation. It would then be “minimally decent” to carry the unborn child to term. However, this doesn’t seem to apply to the planned pregnancy abortion. If the mother—intentionally pregnant—decided to abort in the seventh month, it would remain “minimally decent,” as according to Thomson’s argument, for her to carry to term. However, the same can’t be said for mothers in their fourth month, third month, or even at conception. She makes yet another distinction that justifies abortion in this case.

    It is possible to make the case for abortion in a planned pregnancy because Thomson’s point is not situation-dependent; rather it is an overarching distinction between rights of the mother and that of the fetus. As she says, “It's rather a shocking idea that anyone's rights should fade away and disappear as it gets harder and harder to accord to them” (Thomson 112). Keeping in line with that statement, the underlining value is that the fetus’ right to life never trumps the mother’s right to her body. Therefore it would be incredibly irresponsible for a mother to obtain an abortion after a planned pregnancy, but it nevertheless remains her right to do so. Warren makes an argument of this nature in her paper, somewhat ironically given her earlier contention. Although it refers to the potentiality argument (that a fetus is a potential person), it is most appropriate here as well:

There may well be something immoral, and not just imprudent, about wantonly destroying potential people… But even if a potential person does have some right to life, that right could not possibly outweigh the right of a woman to obtain an abortion, since the rights of any actual person invariably outweigh those of any potential person, whenever the two conflict. (Warren 123, italics mine)

    This further illustrates Thomson’s idea, highlighting the values associated with her argument is making them applicable in this case as well. Although her main argument is couched in an analogy, the overall theme of that argument—about the rights of the mother trumping those of the fetus—is the central tenant of this successful pro-choice argument.

THE MORAL COMMUNITY & CRITERION FOR PERSONHOOD
    Warren attempts to solve the perceived problem with specificity in Thomson’s rights-based argument by addressing a different set of criteria. The first of which is the theory of a moral community, to which, she suggests, a fetus does not belong. She argues, “the moral community consists… of all persons, rather than all genetically human entities” (Warren 119, italics in original). This is the platform for the second part of her argument concerning the criterion for personhood. Here she suggests six criteria that one must meet, at least in part, to be considered a person and therefore part of the moral community. These are sentience, emotionality, reason, the capacity to communicate, self-awareness and moral agency.

    The first, and most obvious, point of contention to Warren’s criteria is: How can one draw the line between human and not human based on six criteria? More to the point, it is far too subjective to say, “You must have more than half to be considered human,” or to say, “You only need to fulfill one criterion, and then you are human.” But Warren diffuses this criticism at the onset, arguing, “all I need to claim is that an entity that has none of these six characteristics is not a person” (Warren 120, italics in original).
   
    Warren goes on to do just that, addressing each of the criteria, and successfully excluding a fetus from her definition of personhood. She concludes, “(A fetus) is not even minimally sentient, let alone capable of emotion, reason, sophisticated communication, self-awareness, or more agency” (Warren 121). Following the anti-abortionist logic that (1) killing a person is wrong, (2) a fetus is a person, (3) killing a fetus is wrong, pro-choicers can employ Warren’s moral community argument to once again justify abortion as morally acceptable on the grounds that a fetus is not a person.

    Marquis comes to argue, though, that there is an essential flaw in the moral community argument. He suggests that the pro-choice syllogism’s major premise is that “only persons have the right to life” (Marquis 128). This involves a problem of scope when addressing other persons such as infants, the severely retarded or some of the mentally ill, who seem to fall outside of the moral community as Warren comes to define it.

    According to Marquis, there is little we can do to avoid a problem of scope in the abortion debate using traditional arguments. As he says, “opponents of abortion, on the one hand, look around for the broadest possible plausible criterion, so that fetuses will fall under it,” (Marquis 127) while “those who believe abortion is morally permissible wish to find a narrow, but plausible, criterion for possession of the right to life so that fetuses will fall outside of it” (Marquis 128). There are indeed scope problems inherent in the debate, but this impasse fails to discredit the points made in support of abortion. Warren addresses the issue of children in her article when she says:

Human beings… naturally care for small children, and other members of the social community who are not currently capable of moral agency. Moreover, we are all vulnerable to the temporary or permanent loss of the mental capacities necessary for moral agency. Thus, we have self-interested as well as altruistic reasons for extending basic moral rights to infants and other sentient human beings who have already been born, but who currently lack some of these other mental capacities. (Warren 121)

    This serves to include those individuals, as Marquis identified, who may fall outside of Warren’s definition of moral community. In addition, this method does not keep with Marquis’ idea of pro-choicers maintaining a narrow definition so that a fetus becomes excluded. It seems that pro-choicers are doing quite the opposite—creating a broad definition that nevertheless finds fetuses on the outside. This also leaves room for future moral agents, such as “machines whose mental and behavioural capacities make them persons,” and at that time we will be “morally obliged to respect the moral rights of these nonhuman persons” (Warren 121). Warren’s point endures the criticism from Marquis and remains applicable in tandem with Thomson’s earlier rights-based argument to once again support the legitimization of abortion.

THE FUTURE LIKE OURS
    Marquis attempts to depart from the traditional rights-based arguments and Warren’s moral community argument in favour of a new approach. What Marquis attempts to do is ignore the debate concerning the status of a fetus, since, as he argues, it is irrelevant. Instead he employs a theory called a “future like ours,” which attempts to explain why killing is considered a bad thing. He suggests that “premature death is a misfortune, in general, because it deprives an individual of a future of value. An individual’s future will be valuable to that individual if that individual will come, or would come, to value it” (Marquis 131).

    This is perhaps the strongest argument against abortion in the current discourse. By routing the focus away from the human status of the fetus and reframing the argument around its adult life gives this old idea a fresh face. But how exactly does this differ from the potentiality argument of years past?

    The potentiality argument says that since (1) a person has a right to life, and (2) a fetus is a potential person, then (3) the fetus has a right to life. But as Marquis says, we don’t give potential presidents the same rights as presidents, and we don’t allow potential voters to vote (Marquis 132). The distinction Marquis makes with his FLO argument is that the fetus will, if born, learn to value things in this world the same as we would, and therefore will come to possess a future like ours. Whether or not it is a person or a potential person before birth, Marquis argues, fails to change its ability to achieve an FLO. It is the forced denial of this future that makes killing morally impermissible. Therefore his logic is as follows: (1) depriving a person of an FLO is impermissible, (2) aborting a fetus deprives it of an FLO, (3) therefore abortion is impermissible.
   
    If we allow this premise—that depriving a person of an FLO is impermissible—it is still possible to make a case for abortion. If we consider that a fetus is not yet a “person”—a moral agent and part of the moral community—we can conclude that it is not yet impermissible to deprive it of an FLO. In fact, it is possible to argue that the fetus will never achieve an FLO.

    This point relies on the fact that a fetus, unlike a newborn child, has not yet developed sentience or cognitive function and is not yet a part of the moral community. Once a fetus has developed these functions, it ceases being a fetus and becomes a person.

    One can argue that aborting a fetus is not robbing it of an FLO because it will never have an FLO. A person at age 10 and at age 70 are in fact the same person, but they are not the same as the fetus—its sentience not yet formed, its place within the moral community not yet ratified. Therefore the FLO argument fails to prohibit abortion since it is possible to separate the fetus for the person who will experience the eventual FLO. If it possible to make this case, then it is once again possible to justify abortion as morally permissible act.
 
CONCLUSION
    All parties involved with this debate present salient arguments for their respective sides. It is clear, however, that given the arguments against abortion and those supporting choice, abortion is in fact morally permissible. Thomson’s famous violinist analogy provides an unequivocal answer to the question of abortion due to rape. Her underlining argument about the rights of the mother outweighing those of the fetus influences Warren’s paper. She argues that a fetus is not a member of the moral community and does not meet any of the six characteristics for personhood. Marquis attempted to rebut these claims but failed to show how the moral community logic was flawed. In fact, it was entirely possible to explain the place of children and the handicapped within the moral community. Finally, Marquis tried to subvert the rights-based and community-based arguments with his FLO argument. While it is the most coherent point for anti-abortionists, it systemically ignores the status of the fetus as a person. When factoring in that a fetus in fact changes into a person—a moral agent—it becomes clear that it is impossible to deprive it of an FLO, because it is the person, and not the fetus, who will receive an FLO. Overall it is clear that abortion is a morally permissible act in almost every case.



Bibliography

Marquis, Don. “An Argument that Abortion Is Wrong.” Ethics in Practice. Ed. Hugh LaFollette. Blackwell Publishers, 1997: 91-102.

Thomson, Judith Jarvis. “A Defense of Abortion.” Philosophy & Public Affairs. Blackwell Publishing, 1971: 47-66.

Warren, Mary Anne. “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion.” Ethics in Practice. Ed. Hugh LaFollette. Blackwell Publishers, 1997: 79-90.

White, James E. Contemporary Moral Problems. Thomson Wadsworth Inc., Belmont, CA, 2006. 104-136.

February 11

Choclair - Flagship



Toronto hip-hop is often tattered with unnecessarily complex albums that try to be more intellectual than entertaining. But Choclair’s seventh album, Flagship, ignores this tired motif and brings a fresher, less pedantic sound to the scene. Tracks like “What I Do” are practically Kanye West-ian in their production, with a relentless snare and horn section through the verse and a choir to carry the hook. The slower “Let Them Dimples Show” gives a taste of Chox’s diversity and charisma over a less abrasive beat. With enough shout-outs to make any Canuck proud, Choclair’s latest should stay true to it’s namesake and pave the way for a second Canadian hip-hop revolution.

Still Searching

A Report on the Information
Retrieval Behaviours of
Social Science Students


Finding Information


    During interviews conducted over a seven-day period, information was collected with regards to the information-seeking behaviour of four undergraduate social science students (herein referred to as "the students"). The context of these interviews was relating to their essay-writing process either at present or in the past. The conclusions reached through these interviews have been compared with data from a number of academic primary sources to form conclusions about information needs, information sources, and information-seeking habits within this sector. These conclusions speak to both the accuracy and relevance of the comparative research as well as its practical application to everyday situations involving information retrieval for undergraduate students. This paper will begin by examining how information needs were established, followed by the manner in which the students sought this information, and conclude with how the information-seeking process forms patterns across students in this area.

    Information needs for the students seem to be formed vicariously, either via teacher instruction or indirect thinking about the subject at hand. That is to say that none of the subjects, on average, systematically addressed their information needs before beginning their particular assignment. Instead, their search strategy was formed as they began their search, with initial results dictating what refinements were needed. One student remarked that they simply type their thesis into the search engine Google and examine the results, hoping for the best returns. Another subject noted that information needs are usually outlined on the handout provided by the professor, with some providing a long list of tips and keywords pertaining to their particular essay topic.

    This corroborates with the information seeking steps established by David Ellis—more specifically his first step, which is aptly titled "starting" (Meho & Tibbo). In this step, those involved with the social science academia often refer to sources that have been used before and those that are expected to give relevant information (ibid). In the case of the aforementioned Google, the ubiquitous search engine is a common starting point for recreational searches. Therefore beginning an academic search here falls within Ellis' idea of using "sources that have been used before" (ibid). Also noteworthy is Ellis' idea that students will use "sources that are expected to provide relevant information" (ibid). This parallels the teacher's direct instruction by word-of-mouth, handout or e-mail.

    The majority of the students appeared to use handouts as a starting point between information found therein and further information elsewhere. For example, one subject noted that their professor "always lists a few authors that have written a lot on the subject." She then takes this information and performs searches based on this information provided by the professor. This meets the criteria for Ellis' second step, "chaining" (Meho & Tibbo). Here, information seekers will follow "chains of citations or other forms of referential connection between materials or sources identified during starting activities” (ibid). This step seems to fall under the information gathering rather than information needs, but since the subjects saw little difference between the two, and since their information needs were discovered haphazardly through initial searches, this criteria is an appropriate transition point between information needs and actively searching.

    Information seeking encompasses the largest part of the research process for the subjects. This step involves applying their information needs to various databases, indexes, search engines, library catalogues and other information resources to uncover relevant information. In the case of the students, this step also refines further their information needs to better understand what they are specifically searching for. At this step, Internet and computer-based searches are the most common starting point for a variety of reasons. This trend seems consistent with current undergraduate students in all sectors. One study revealed some possible explanations for this. The most common response for using computer-based searching was the convenience (38%) and efficiency (43%) associated with the medium (Norelli et al). Additionally, a number of students (14%) cited the ability for "one-stop-shopping" for Internet searches (ibid). This idea refers to the ability to sometimes download the full text of the journal article or book passage as text, PDF or image format. This matches closely with the students, who noted that the ability for Off-Campus computer access to the University's online library system made it "like having a library in my bedroom."

    Given that, in this case, the students are using the University library resources, some attention should now be directed towards how students come to search on a database as opposed to Google or similar recreational search engines. Studies show that "users choose databases because someone directed them to it" (Norelli et al). This matches with the earlier comment on teacher handouts and oral advice relating to the students' essays. Other reasons for choosing a database include its format (for example, full text availability), ease of use, or having used the particular database before (ibid). According to the study, "nearly 40% of students indicated that they chose a particular source because of its subject area or scope of coverage" (ibid). The report continues, "nearly 30% responded that they were directed by a professor to a particular source" (ibid). Again, this corroborates the role of the professor in information seeking behaviours of the students. Those interviewed indicated that they only knew of these databases and resources through in-school presentations on library resources. Since all interviewed students are undergraduate first-year students, this seems to indicate a further role of faculty intervention at the onset of their academic career to shape their information seeking behaviours.

    Assuming that the students have chosen to use a computer based resource and assuming they have chosen a database such as the library catalogue index, the students must now begin entering their search terms and commencing their research. The most common approach reported from the students was to begin with a general search using the keywords for their assignment. A search that found numerous returns (>1000) was not immediately refined by three of the four students. Instead, these students browsed the first page of returns searching for relevant entries. This goes against what most information scientists suggest, which is to further refine the search by adding additional terms, adding synonyms, or perhaps changing the database altogether (Norelli et al). Additionally, only one student knew what a Boolean operator was, or used them to refine their search. Reports suggest that average students who lack this knowledge may be compromising their search queries unintentionally. Since few students know about Boolean operators like “AND” or “OR,” students typically expect the search engine to understand these words as part of their search phrase (Brophy & Griffiths). In relation to the search behaviour of the interviewed students (they decided on search criteria only when they began searching), the adopted mentality is that of, “I’ll know it when I see it,” which “creates difficulties in formulation of a query statement” (ibid).

    Of course there are other information retrieval methods besides Internet databases and search engines. These include other primary resources like informal sources, newspapers, magazines, radio, etc. It seems to be the case that the students do little to capitalize on these available sources. One reason is that the students may be ignoring some of their information needs or may not have recognized the need for diversifying their resources. Again, the ease of use is the most common reason, as other resources typically require more effort than simply using the Internet (Norelli et al). Similarly, experts suggest that the level of difficulty for the assignment also effects how diligently the students make use of available resources (Bannister et al). For example, undergraduate students writing their dissertation become consumed with the research aspect of the paper (ibid). Personal agency becomes a central part of their involvement, as the autonomy over the direction of their paper provides increased responsibility (ibid). In the case of newspaper and magazine articles, these resources are now largely available online. So while the students fail to reference newspapers or trade publications that could provide relevant information for their essay, they do search passively for this information online. Secondary sources are used most frequently throughout the search process, as search engines, library catalogues, indexes and databases are the first stop for the students. Government information and sources are used via online methods when applicable, such as when population statistics are required.

    Now that the information needs and seeking habits of the students has been analyzed, it is now possible to conclude this paper by discussing the information habits of the students’ overall research process. Largely, the students’ habits match with information available on social science research. It is fair to conclude, however, that these students are even more entrenched in Internet use. By and large the students made little-to-no use of resources other than the Internet. But conversely, research shows that students writing dissertations are more likely to diversify their resources. This may point to a degree of apathy with regards to undergraduate social science students and their assignments; for if they fail to invest autonomously in their assignments, their research may be neglected. Even still, when it comes to research in the social science field, some authors suggest that classroom assignments are no substitute for the real thing (Winn). When students enter the work force, they tend to acknowledge the depth and importance of the task at hand and make further use of the resources available (ibid). This leads to the conclusion that students in social science must be able to gauge the importance of their research before fully utilizing all available resources or performing searches that are fully productive (ibid). Until that time, these students—and indeed students in the faculty of social science—may well struggle with their information seeking and information retrieval.
 


Bibliography
Bannister, Phil, and Clegg, Sue, and Todd, Malcolm. Independent inquiry and the undergraduate
dissertation: perceptions and experiences of final-year social science students.
Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education, Volume 29, Issue 3. Jun. 2004.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0260293042000188285>

Brophy, Peter, and Griffiths, Jill R. Student searching behaviour in the JISC Information
Environment. Centre for Research in Library & Information Management (CERLIM).
Online. 10 Oct. 2002. <http://www.ariadne.ac.uk/issue33/edner/intro.html>

Markham, William T. “Research Methods in the Introductory Course: To Be or Not to Be?”
Teaching Sociology, American Sociological Association (1991): 464-471.

Meho, Lokman I., and Tibbo, Helen R. “Modeling the information-seeking behavior of social
scientists: Ellis's study revisited.” Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology (2003): 570-587.¬

Norelli, Barbara, and Seiden, Peggy, and Szymborski, Kris. Undergraduate Students in the
Digital Library: Information Seeking Behavior in an Heterogeneous Environment.
Association of College & Research Libraries. Online. 2005. <http://news.ala.org/ala/acrlbucket/nashville1997pap/seidenszymborski.htm>

Winn, Sandra. “Learning by doing: Teaching research methods through student participation in a
commissioned research project.” Studies in Higher Education (Jan 1995): 203-214.



February 07

Reviews and Next Year

Here are some more reviews for that pilot magazine. No word on it's publication, but production is in full swing according to my contact. Layout and such.

Also, this week was "Intent to Register Week" and I went to the seminar thing. Decided that I will probably double major in Political Science and MIT. I take the same number of courses every semester, except I get fewer electives. But at the end of it I get two degrees. Also, if I take some writing classes, I get a writing certificate too. Damn those credentials.


Jay-Z - Kingdom Come
After the Black Album, Jay-Z professed he was backing out of the rap game. But here he is, once again, with Kingdom Come. Mostly the album is top-notch Jay-Z flows, high production values and almost everything you would expect from Young Hova. But that's just it, it's exactly what you'd expect from the 37-year-old entrepreneur. Tracks like "30 Something" give us a taste of the "maturation of Jay-Zeezy," where he acknowledges his age while reassuring us of his relevance. But others like the brass-laden single "Show Me What You Got" may hint at his disassociation from the rap game. What may well be an attempt at originality just comes off as stagnant in a sea of hotter radio singles. For Jay-Z lovers your prayers have been answered, but if you're a hater you'll find enough to beef about on his latest.



Fall Out Boy - Infinity on High
Any strong criticism of Fall Out Boy's third album Infinity on High seems a bit persnickety. They started out as a grassroots pop-punk band with witty chick-bashing lyrics and an enamored fan base. Since then they have evolved into a little more than that: a self-conscious success story couched in newfound guitar riffs, Patrick Strump's hi-fi vocals and a new toolbox of tricks for the third go 'round. Their first two albums were largely the same, but this album brings in choir-like band singalongs, samples, horns, piano, and Jigga himself--yes, the rumours are true, Jay-Z provides the introduction. Tracks like "The Take Over, The Break's Over" shows the guitarist's reinvented take on the pop-punk guitar. The Rocky-esque conclusion "I've Got All This Ringing In My Ears And None On My Fingers" is the most notable song on the 14-track album and may predict the band's future. The playful song brings a dynamic structure, acting more like a movie's score than a FOB track. One could even call it mature, that is, until the track ends with computer synthesized voice saying, "Now press repeat." If you're expecting a Fall Out Boy album, you'll get it; if you're expecting a departure from their last two attempts, you'll get that too.


Akon - Konvicted
Akon should reconsider inviting guest rappers for 15 tracks (out of 19) on his second album, Konvicted. Sure, the extra rappers do provide some diversity for Akon's R&B sound. But it also leads to doubts about his ability to hold an album without being overshadowed by superior artists. On the follow-up to the 2004 Grammy-nominated album Trouble, Akon chases after artists like Snoop Dogg, Eminem, Papoose, P Money and 11 more artists that, in many ways, surpass Akon's own talents. Lyrically inept tracks like "Smack That" become instant radio fanfare when paired with a club beat and Eminem's trademark flow. It's hard to sit through dated lines like "just kick it like Tae Bo" after listening to Eminem's fluid verse. Snoop Dogg features on the more salient "I Wanna Fuck You," a unqiue take on the love ballad, complete with Akon's overt sexuality foregrounded once again. But this is also the best prediction of one possible future for Akon. If he can't produce an album where he steals the limelight, instead of passing it off to featured artists, Akon may go the way of Nate Dogg--eternal chorus creator for the rest of his career.



Justin Timberlake - Future Sex / Love Sounds
.Bonafide hit-maker and all-star producer Timbaland has returned for another collaboration with Timberlake on his most coherent effort yet. It's hard to say where JT would be with old Timbaland at the controls, but the final product is nothing to question. Tracks like "...What Goes Around... Comes Around (Interlude)" are a testament to Timberlake's diversity, beginning as a bereft love tune and evolving over its 7:28 runtime into rap-like techno breakdown for the latter few minutes. Summer wonders like "SexyBack" are unorthodox offerings for the album's premiere single but succeeded effortlessly on the radio. Timberlake also dials up the thug qualities in his music without compromising his soprano vocals by adding some softer verses that are borderline spoken word. From the first spin to the last bonus track Future Sex / Love Sounds may be regarded as Timberlake's best album ever.



My Chemical Romance - The Black Parade
The once indie favourite My Chemical Romance has now become a critical sensation and radio phenomenon with their second major release The Black Parade. They have fine tuned their crass take on emo rock and have succeeded in creating the hottest concept album since Green Day's American Idiot. The headlining track, "Welcome To The Black Parade" is a visceral pastiche of sounds ranging from the piano introduction, obfuscated vocals and modern guitar playfulness. This album may become the much-needed kick in emo rock's ass, shooing in a new era of epic rock that harks back to the hair metal days. Or, if the radio fanfare continues unchecked, may become shooed away as another emo pop sensation. My vote goes to the former.
January 23

Fashion article for a pilot magazine

Wrote this for a men's magazine that is currently in production for national release. The demographic is 18-26 so they're definitely catering to dumb kids. And that's how I wrote it. It's a real fluff piece, I mean it, but it gets the facts across. I can think of a few people who could benefit from these "tips." Overall, nothing revolutionary, but the editor loved it, so I'm happy with it.

=========

What looks like a trendy French masterpiece to women will inevitably look like another stupid t-shirt to most guys. Men are generally born with a mental handicap when it comes to fashion, but shopping for threads doesn't have to be reserved for a metrosexual's wet dream. In fact, with the right playbook of do's and do-not's, choosing your own wardrobe can be as easy as choosing your favourite beer. With seasons changing from winter to spring, now is the perfect time to overhaul your wardrobe and pick up some hot new clothes that will last.

LAYERING
Layering is an idea that seems easy on the surface, but tends to be overwhelming as you try to match colours or patterns. The concept behind layering is making your outfit stand out, with multiple tops that compliment each other. An example of a layered outfit is a graphic-t under a zip-up hoodie under a blazer. Keep all your outfits between two and four layers. This gives you a fashion-forward, put-together look that separates you from the slobs out there.

The key to layering is choosing one dominant pattern or colour and finding pieces that compliment it. So when you're out shopping and you see a button-up shirt that you really like, choose one of colours in the shirt and pick out an undershirt that matches (if you have one at home, even better). Next, you want to layer something overtop of the button-up. Keep in mind that any pieces you pick out should always compliment the dominant piece in the ensemble. So if the button-up you picked out has a strong pattern (for example, a colourful plaid), stick to a solid or soft pattern sweater overtop. That's right, you can wear two different patterns together, as long as one is dominant and the other subtle. If the button-up is solid, make the sweater your dominant piece by choosing a pattern, extra detailing, or more colour.

Apply this example elsewhere for a similar effect. Instead of pulling out colours from the items you pick out, choose your own original colours by matching it to a palette. This is a more complicated technique, but generally you can match Earth tones with Earth tones (greens, browns, blues), pastels with other pastels, and neutrals go with everything (black, gray and white).

OUTERWEAR
During winter, too many guys double their snowboarding jacket for everyday wear. Some seem to think that they'll freeze unless they bundle up in a parka, but that's not always the case. Even on the coldest days you can wear a jacket without much lining and stay toasty and trendy.

If you're conservative, choose neutral blacks and grays, finding jackets with excess zippers and pockets for your detailing. If you're feeling adventurous, or if the idea of owning multiple jackets doesn't disturb you, then look for a "signature piece." This is a bright or unique coat that will get you recognized. Eye-catching patterns like bright colours or plaid can be great for achieving this effect, but if this idea doesn't suit your personality then don't push it.

When you're out shopping, think about where you might wear the coat. Cheapskates should seriously consider splurging on a nice stylish jacket for wearing to clubs or other places where you want to impress the chicks. Waist-length coats are great for mild days and often feature a more garish use of zippers, pockets, and detailed trim, making them perfect for casual day wear. Try on every jacket for fit. You want all your clothes to look like they were built just for you, but also allow a little room in your jacket for sweaters and other layers underneath. Keep the cut to above the knee but at the waist or below for a chic younger look--and always pop the collar!

SHOES
Winter may have destroyed your favourite runners and wearing ski boots to class just doesn't cut it. Spring may be the perfect opportunity for tossing out every dirty, disgusting sneaker in your wardrobe and step it up to a better shoe collection. Some guys operate on a one-shoe-fits-all basis, where that pair of black Converse high-tops see as many dance floors as offices. If you want to be considered stylish, new kicks are at the top of the list.

Every man should own at least one nice pair of leather shoes. You may think leather is too dressy or grown-up, but modern designer collections include looks that are both dressed up and dressed down to suit any style. Take for example this hip city shoe from Aldo. It's a murky brown leather with a square toe and laces, complete with subtle stitching and smooth lines across all sides. The colour and fit gives the shoe some serious casual appeal, while the leather itself gives you and your outfit a classier look. Leather may be a new experience for you, but once you try one on you'll begin to understand why it's a necessity.

When you're shopping for shoes, watch for details that give the shoe the look you want. Extra stitching creates interesting lines and gives the shoe a sleek look that's easily noticed. You can go with or without laces, as the slip-on style of shoe continues to have a strong presence in casual wear. If you want to stick with runners, avoid sport-specific shoes that are meant for the track. Slender tennis-type shoes are good for a casual look and bulkier skater-type shoes may fit your style nicely. If you're thinking about matching them to your wardrobe, don't sweat it too hard; shoes can serve to "pop" your outfit by containing a completely different colour or eye-catching pattern.

PANTS
Like shoes, some guys only own one or two pairs of jeans. While this certainly gets the job done from day-to-day, it does little to up the ante in the fashion department.

First a rundown on jean basics. All jeans have differences in cut based on rise, thigh width, lower-leg width and cuff shape. Rise means the length from the crotch seam (the point in the center where both legs meet) to the top of the jean. Newer trendy jeans have a low-rise that may make larger guys uncomfortable. This rise works best for thinner and average body types. Look for rises that give enough room for your rump. The width of the jean continues through the thighs and the lower-leg. Loose fitting jeans will have a wide thigh and lower-leg, while a bootcut will have a fitted thigh and a loose lower-leg (note that this is not a flare, which is a fitted thigh and an extremely loose lower-leg). Straight-leg jeans, as the name implies, has a fitted thigh and a fitted lower-leg.

Cuffs can also come in bootcut, where the cuff continues to be wide; straight, where the cuff matches the width of the lower-leg; or tapered, where the cuff decreases the width from the lower-leg. Jeans look good in bootcut cuffs, while trousers and other pants look best in straight cuff. Designers will have variations of these three styles in their collections. Stick to what works best for your body shape and always try them on before buying.

Jean washes continue to come in faded and destroyed styles. Some designers have been exploring even more destroyed, worn-in styles like paint stains and the like, but avoid these if you don't have the upper-body wardrobe to match. It's good to get a mix of washes for various uses, so for every destroyed pair you grab, make sure to balance it out with a more subtle wash as well. Remember, black is always dressier, and in a jean that means a nice mixture of casual classiness that can really work for you. Lighter jeans work great for school and work days, or nights when you're just hanging out.

Remember these tips are merely guidelines, and while sticking to them keeps you safely stylish, don't be afraid to push the limits of your fashion mentality. When you know the general rules for what works together and what doesn't, as well as what clothes work best for you body type, you have half the battle of shopping for clothes in the bag. Now is the perfect time to upgrade your look for the new season so take advantage of the opportunity and have some fun while you're at it!

January 18

Marks, Overview: Term One

This is term one/year one in review. I don't have my final exam mark for my half-year courses but I have my final grade in its place. I'll write a bit about each class, sort of talking about what I liked and didn't like. But if you're here for the cold hard marks go ahead and look. Yeah, they're high, but I'm in the first term of a first year program.


125 years for them, 1 for me



Film - Introduction to Film Theory (elective, full-year)

When ignorant people think of a film class, they think of watching interesting movies and dissecting them for the real meaning behind it all. Maybe you'd watch Spielberg's Schindler's List and gather the thematic nuances and examine the director's unique choices of camera angles and editing. But then you'd be wrong. Because the movie merely illustrates a "movement" or some other theoretical concept that has no real value to the casual student. This course could be described as "terrible," but that's just a bit harsh. It is simply more work than you'd expect from a class that seems fun.

We have four required textbooks. The first is Film Experience, a nicely worded introduction to film theory with lots of pictures. The second is Film Analysis, a convoluted collection of essays from various film theorists that examine specific films we watch in class that goes way too deep into analyzing not only the film, but the long history leading up to the film, and about a million other things. The third is a course pack, which is a collection of photocopies from even more essays about various filmmakers, movements, etc.

The final book is possibly the worst book I've ever read. It's called Cinema Studies: The Key Concepts and it's by some tard calling itself Susan Hayward. I swear, she must think she's the be-all, end-all of film theorists. She picks out certain film terms like "gender" and writes about a million pages on it, leaping through tangent points and back again before you can make two cents of it. Take this sentence on "class" for example:

The overdetermination or valorization of the family, that is, over-investment in its importance in 1950s melodramas and, incidentally, comedy -- the Doris Day effect: the squeaky-clean girl next door -- is a case in point.

Indeed... wait, what!? Not only does that have the vaguest association with "class," but its the most ill-conceived sentence one can dream up. She's not writing this for people trying to learn about film. She's trying to prove to her peers that she's got the nutsack to write about everything under the sun. The whole text yells in your face about how smart she is. I've stopped reading it, actually. I just look it up the terms on Wikipedia for a more succinct explanation.

Midterm - 95%
Essay #1 - 80%
Essay #2 - 87%
Final Exam - 78%



MIT - Media in Society (required, half-year)
This course was mostly theoretical nonsense. We read a bunch of books and short stories, watched a few movies, then tried to "close read" them for their larger thematic resonance, or whatever. It's fine and all but I don't see the practicality of it.

What this class did do, though, is get me in a mindset of questioning everything. "It's like this, but why?" The professor, Tim Blackmore, was great for entertainment but he hated structure, at the cost of his students' sanity.

Midterm - 86%
Take-home essay - 90%
Final Exam - 80%
Final Grade - 85%



Psychology - Introduction to Psychology (elective, full-year)
I still can't figure out why this class doesn't count as a science credit. It's like Biology 101 sometimes, I swear. I really don't care for this class as much as I thought I would. I mean, the material covered is relevant, it's not theoretical chatter about godknowswhat. But it's only practical to those pursuing psychology. There is really no point for me to take this class, but I have to budget time to get the readings done. Which comes down to a waste of time. The textbook is good though.

Midterm - 88.1%
Final Exam - 80.3%



Political Science - Introduction to Political Science (elective, full-year)
I sort of have a love/hate relationship with this course, in that I love it sometimes and hate other times. My first term professor, Westmacott, is this exalted poli sci guru who seems to know everything about everything to do with politics. He's actually a really nice guy. I spent one Friday morning with him during his office hours and we chatted for a long time. He's about five feet tall, gray hair where there's still some left, and wears a trench coat. Some girls call him cute, and he is in a "Grandpa" kind of way.

But man does he give a lot of information. The readings are dry, but that's to be expected with poli sci. The tough part is the amount of information he's giving you. Everything from various political systems to voting systems to god knows what else. During a lecture, he'll be talking about something completely off the wall and then say, "Now that would be a good question for the exam!" I mean, at least he's dropping those kinds of hints, but what he points out is always so obscure! Anyway, I have no real gripe with this class or with Westmacott. His exam was a real bitch though, I'm not kidding.

Midterm take-home essay - 95%
Participation - 95%
Final Exam - 68.8%



Computer Science - Introduction to Computer Science (mandatory, half-year)
If you've been paying attention, there's been a lot of "introductions" to subjects this year. And maybe that's why the first year of MIT really blows. This comp sci course, however, was a real bird. Some kids didn't pay attention, or never came to class, and suffered in the assignments and the exams. In the past they've covered subjects like, get this, how to use Word. No kidding, Microsoft Word. Like "how to save a file" and things like that.

This year they changed it around with four new units about HTML, Excel, Java and Access (databases). The HTML is nothing new to me and was easy as hell. Excel was actually a bit of work, but it's easy to wrap my head around that kind of stuff. Java was a useless unit since they didn't teach us any real coding (that was too complex). Instead they just taught us how to read some preexisting code and decipher what would happen if you changed this 0 to a 1. No wonder some kids failed. The last unit, Access, was the trickiest of the lot. You had to have these relational diagrams and then transfer them into the program. The whole thing was a real mess, but I did OK.

This was my best mark, obviously, which makes me think of going into this profession. Then I remember I still want to have a soul in 10 years.

Assignment 1 (HTML) - 94.4%
Assignment 2 (Excel) - 88.9%
Midterm - 97%
Assignment 3 (Java) - 100%
Assignment 4 (Access) - 84.3%
Participation - 100%
Final Exam - yet to be released
Final Grade - 93%
January 17

StillSoul interview/article for the Gazette

I did this interview at 12:30 on Monday and had the article done by that night. Usually I like to sit on these kinds of things but I obviously had no choice, working on the Gazette's schedule and all.

I like how it turned out. In retrospect, I think a stronger premise would be the singer's acting career, since it's inherently more interesting. I left that out though, mostly because it seemed like too much to explain. What with him living in LA half the time acting then coming to Canada to be in a band. See you're already confused.

These two were really, really nice guys though, and had a lot to say about their music and genre and all. Check them out on MySpace. The editors said they want me back to write more for them so I'm pretty excited. Stay tuned. And... begin:




"We crafted something that's basically an amalgamation of different types of music. It's a little bit of reggae and a little bit of jazz, but we're not a reggae band and we're not a jazz band," explains StillSoul guitarist and current Western student Jeff Lurie.

The largely reggae-based sound of StillSoul contains a nuanced medley of nearly every genre under the sun. Tonight at 29 Park, the foursome invites Western students to experience their pervasive take on funk, rock, hip hop, and everything in between.

The group formed in 2005 and after a year of casual touring they took to the studio for a five-day recording session. In that time they produced a three-track demo that exemplifies their contemporary sound. Rounding out the band roster is Dave Clarke on bass, Chris Reineck on percussion and Jonathan Malen on vocals.

With an understated remnance of funk, a blues-inspired guitar, and exuberant melodies from 19-year-old Malen, the group is poised to follow the recent success of Canadian acts like Bedouin Soundclash and illScarlett.

"The comforting thing about it is that now there are bands like Bedouin Soundclash," Lurie says. "Yes, they're paving the ground, but that means that more people will be ready to listen to that type of music."

StillSoul's track entitled "Erin's Song" is perhaps the most "single-worthy," according to Lurie, and represents a milestone in the band's song-writing legacy. Malen's playful melody paired with the percussion and guitar dynamics makes the track a strong contender for radio play.

"'Erin's Song' is about relationships. Well, more about friendships, and how friendship is more important than having a one-night stand with somebody," explains Malen.

Yet despite recent reggae success on the national stage, the group is no more single-oriented than before.

"Luckily, we don't know the first thing about what record labels want," says Malen with a laugh. "If we have 20 songs, maybe zero of them are singles. In our minds, we think 15 of them could be singles, obviously. I don't think we're that single-conscious, no, I think we're just trying to put good music out there."

For songwriter Malen, the band is but one aspect of his two-part artistic life. When he's not writing and playing gigs for StillSoul, Malen spends time pursuing an acting career. His dedication recently landed him a role in the Antonio Bandaras vehicle Take The Lead and an upcoming part with Robert Downey Jr. in Charlie Bartlett.

The group's song-writing process is a fluid affair, with all four members bringing their unique tastes to the table. "Erin's Song," for example, originally included a slow breakdown, but after "six or seven or ten shows," Lurie suggested replacing it with a reggae piece and the song evolved into its current, catchier form.

"Sometimes we consciously say, 'OK, this is cool, but maybe we need to get a different effect,'" says Lurie of their song-writing process. "So we'll try to make it a little more hip hoppy, we'll try to make it a little more funky."

At a StillSoul show, spectators can expect an energetic, comfortable experience.

"The interesting thing about our concerts is we try to stay as down to Earth as possible," says Lurie. "Honestly, personally, when I play I wish everyone was in my living room, just having a good time. We love people dancing, and if they know some of our chorus and they sing it... it's a thrilling experience."

The music is easily accessible to a variety of tastes. After playing with a few screamo bands, the group discovered that they were more welcomed than anticipated.

"A lot of people have told us after the show that we're just playing different music than other people," says Lurie. "They've come up to us and said, 'You know what, even though I don't listen to your type of music, I like you.' And that's the most humbling thing that someone's ever told me. That's what I ideally want from anyone coming to a StillSoul concert."

Despite the endless mish-mash of influences that opens their music up to this diverse fanbase, the group remains devoted to their roots.

"All of our songs come from the soul and from our different influences, so we're 'still soul.'"

StillSoul plays tonight at 29 Park. Doors open at 9:00 and tickets cost $5. Call 519-617-3949 for tickets or more information.

January 14

Crocodile Conspiracy

Reports are surfacing about yet another conspiracy: Steve Irwin's untimely death may not be as "accidental" as previously thought. Recent reports suggest that the family may have been in cahoots with the show's producers to plan the death of Australia's #1 export, the Crocodile Hunter.


A millionaire in the making?


Documents have surfaced showing an unconfirmed alleged connection between wife Terri Irwin and the show's producer John Stainton. The e-mails apparently show the two musing about the benefits of Steve's untimely departure. "Bindi's career in the industry would flourish in unimaginable ways," Borahm allegedly wrote to Terri, "if Stevey met with an unfortunate accident."

Bindi is, of course, the lovechild of Terri and Steve who, in the four months following her father's death, has been paraded internationally promoting various lucrative projects. Among them is her new TV show, entitled "Bindi, the Jungle Girl," produced by none other than John Stainton. It's interesting to note that Steve's stingray accident occurred while filming a segment for his daughter's show, with Stainton reportedly present during filming.  It's unclear whether or not the conspiracy reaches the upper echelons of the Australian government (a connection posited due to the incredible attention and tourism Australia has received), but further information should be due within the coming weeks, including a possible statement from Terri Irwin herself.

Bindi's other recent appearances include the Ellen DeGeneres Show, a dinner gala with Russel Crowe, a guest appearance on David Letterman, and a concert tribute to her father. Of course, her last father-mourning appearance was the endearing speech during her father's "ceremony," which later became ubiquitos on YouTube and introduced Bindi to the international stage.  People couldn't help but notice her composure and poise during her first world-wide appearance--a true star in the making.

Conspiracy or not, the PR spin factory has surely capitalized on the "accidental" death of Australia's top international celebrity in order to position Bindi as a their next Down Under moneymaker. Did I mention that Bindi was recently named as official Tourism Ambassador for Australia? Interesting indeed.

UPDATE (Jan 15): Terri Irwin confirms recent startling reports that she has destroyed the last remaining footage of Steve Irwin's death. This compelling news galvanizes international worries that the nature of his death will never be ratified by the public.
January 13

'Children of Men' a masterpiece

Simply put, Alfonso Cuaron's Children of Men is as close to a perfect film as I've ever seen. It's an impossibly cohesive masterpiece, a subtle exploration of the human condition in a not-too-distant-future. The artifice of it's story is supplanted by the realism of it's telling and thoroughly succeeds on every front.




The film follows Theo Faron (Clive Owen), a former activist who agrees to help transport Kee (Claire-Hope Ashitey), the first pregnant woman in eighteen years, to safety. Britain has closed its borders and has become obsessed with routing out all illegal immigrants and moving them to cages and concentration camps. These refugees, or simply "fugees," are themselves divided, with some being imprisoned, some fighting for an uprising and still others attempting a more peaceful change. Without any answers posited to the viewer or the characters about Earth's infertility, there seems to be no hope or future for humanity.

Indeed the weight of that plot description makes the film appear to be susceptible to overt sentimentality. Surely in the hands of some directors, the themes could become boisterous and exploited and the story itself may appear as simply unbelievable. But a post-Apocalyptic world has never been presented with such sophistication as that which is found in Children of Men.

Cuaron, who also directed Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban as well as the foreign classic Y tu mamá también, is quite possibly the most effective director of today. Systematically ignoring classic Hollywood conventions of montage, Cuaron presents the world as an uninterrupted "documentary." You are truly a bystander in the flawless world that he has created. Single shots last for minutes, unfolding gently as you follow the characters through the situation. Using this technique, scenes can shift as quickly from calm to chaotic, uninfluenced by the filmmakers bias. Cuaron removes himself from the process, in a sense, taking with him the conscious influence of his message. Instead of directing our experience of the film, he presents the images for our own interpretation, allowing us to explore the subtleties on our own terms.

Clive Owen continues to amaze me in all of his work. Theo is presented initially as a stoic man, seemingly unaffected by the death of the world's youngest boy (Baby Diego, he's called, and is shown to be an 18-year-old celebrity simply due to his age). Later though, after the surprising death of a friend, we follow him away from the others, and he begins to whimper. After only moments, and without cutting shots (to a close-up or otherwise), he is told from a distance that the lot of them must continue moving. He stands, wipes away the tears that barely surfaced, and forces himself back to the car. Moments like this are aplenty in Children and each one brings with it thorough feeling of realism that is simply not seen in modern theatrical film making.

You won't have to spend time pondering the thematic depth of Children--it is a film that caters to both film theorists and casual filmgoers. But even the most laymen spectator can watch the film with their contemporary eye and grasp the social and political importance of a film that succinctly comments on war, the treatment of marginalized individuals and humanity itself. The timeliness of the film, matched with unparalleled performances on all sides, topped only by to prowess of it's filmmaker, make Children of Men a genuine must-see.
December 13

The Da Vinci Code

Just watched the Da Vinci Code last night and I feel a strong desire to weigh in. First of all comparing the movie to the book is pointless and nonsensical. It's like comparing a Grade-A sirloin steak to Campbell's Chunky Steak Soup. Sure, they both come from what's essentially the same place, but the inherent differences are dramatic and shouldn't be ignored. I haven't read the book, so I don't come with any pretentious bias. Review the movie on its own terms.


"Run! Angry fans! And they want blood!"


The production values of the film are strong, and coming from beloved director Ron Howard (Apollo 13, A Beautiful Mind, The Grinch), you wouldn't expect any less. The adapted screenplay, however, leaves much to be desired. I'm not sure if the book was anything like the plot shown here, but the movie is a wannabe chase film sutured to a puzzle-mystery surrounding a murder-mystery... none of which is especially interesting in its own regard.

One has to wonder why a murdered leader of a superstitious and ultra-secretive cult would entrust its most important secrets to an estranged granddaughter (a policewoman no less) and an acquaintance who doesn't seem especially close. I suppose the pretense of double super-secrecy is enough to allow any kind of bizarre behaviour, but the clues he leaves behind are so vague and tangent that it really messes with the suspension of disbelief required for such a mystery.

Take for example the Cryptex: A novel invention purportedly designed by Da Vinci himself. The device requires a five-digit letter combination to open it; inside there's a scroll that's wound around the inside. Any attempt to break it open shatters a glass jar inside housing vinegar, which would presumably dissolve the ink on the scroll, destroying the secret forever. Gasp! Unfortunately, the freezing temperature for vinegar is only -4 degrees C. Simply freezing the device to break it open would suffice. You can see, then, that Dr. Langdon's ability to solve the most complex riddles seems unusually retarded when it comes to the Cryptex... but it's what's necessary to move the plot forward.



As for the performances, Tom Hanks is forgettable as the passive Dr. Langdon. I'm usually a big fan of Hanks, but he's just not engaging enough to make waves in the Code. Catherine Zeta-Jones look-a-like Audrey Tautou is better as venerable agent Sophie Neveu. But scene-stealer Ian McKellen brings it again with his take on Sir Leigh Teabing. When he comes into the picture, the whole film is reborn with a new level of exhilleration and poise. It's like when Rene Zellwegger came into Cold Mountain and made it something worth watching. He's the only one who seems to realize he's in an epic and remembers to have some fun with it.

Case in point would be the only scene that really "decodes" one of Da Vinci's paintings, The Last Supper. McKellen brings us into the discovery and adds excitement to a scene that would have otherwise been quite placid. This is my favourite scene by far, and I owe it entirely to McKellen.

In the end, I would say the film didn't live up to its so-called "hype." But since I didn't invest interest in seeing the book portrayed as-is on screen, I suppose I'm less disappointed than those who read the book and expected just that. Better luck next time, Ronny.
December 08

Snow Squall

For those of you who don't know about the wild snow squall that occurred last night, here are some pics to update you.
Everything is closed in the city and my 2pm exam has been canceled.

If you can't see the pics click here.


My front lawn and the neighbours' cars



It just keeps going and going... down the street.



Taken from inside: the red dot on the bottom left is a taillight, you figure out the rest



Same car from a different angle; the car is silver and you can see the side rear view mirror on the left.



I think this accurately represents how much snow fell.
November 29

CD review for the Gazette

illScarlet – EPdemic
Infect the Masses



Canadian fivesome illScarlet doesn’t rewrite the book on reggae/rock with their full-length debut EPdemic, but they take just enough chances to qualify as more than another diet Sublime.
The album kicks off with Heaters: part Incubus’ Battlestar Scralatchtica, part fast-paced reggae, and part modern radio pop-rock. This track will likely succeed Nothing Special, the band’s first single that became immensely popular on GTA radio.
Jumping from a “fight the power” motto on Nothing Special to an acoustic ballad on One-A, they prove their diversity and add a clap-along climax for good measure.
NTF draws from the band’s rock influences once again, including a brief but gut-busting solo by guitarist Billy Marr.
Overall the biggest drawback is it’s length, clocking in at just 30 minutes. The track listing is inflated by the four-second intro track First Shot and the album’s farewell Mary Jane: an avant-garde finale that is neither appropriate nor warranted.
The album isn’t likely to cause an epidemic as it’s namesake suggests, but it’s still “ill” enough to keep you indoors—at least while celebrating the 4:20, if that’s your thing.

Stuart A. Thompson

Blog live feed to your browser

I discovered that my blog includes a Live link that automatically provides links to the blog entries:
http://stuneen.spaces.live.com/feed.rss

Bookmark this in your Bookmarks Toolbar and you'll get a drop-down that keeps you up-to-date with all the bloggings. If you care that much.
November 28

Making Spaces

How space is defined within the
Alex Kitner death sequence



Get in mah belly


Upon its release, Steven Spielberg’s Jaws (1972) was regarded as an instant hit both critically and commercially. Veteran editor Verna Fields garnered high praise for her dynamic editing style, which in many ways overshadowed the accolades for newcomer Spielberg. The film uses many cinematic editing conventions and employs traditional continuity editing to immerse the viewer in the diegesis. In that respect, the Alex Kitner death scene stands to highlight the film’s editing style. The sequence’s narrative allows for tension and suspense to be conveyed entirely through its editing, while the setting encourages the creative depth to establish individual and separate spaces. Editing is used in the Alex Kitner death sequence to establish the beach as safety and the water as danger, while contrasting these spaces through Martin Brody’s perspective.

The beach is continually portrayed as an area of safety and security for the characters in the film. The first shot in the sequence begins with consecutive pans and then tracks backwards to follow young Alex Kitner in an exceptionally long take as he traverses the beach terrain. The lack of editing here encourages the audience to immerse themselves in the setting of the narrative. This take acts effectively the establishing shot for the sequence, making use of a deep focus to offer a physical picture of the space and mise-en-scène. Unlike analytical editing—where the filmmaker gradually breaks down the general perspective of the establishing shot—this first take is followed by a shot of water from Brody’s perspective—a separate space entirely. This allows the viewer to recognize these spaces as separate entities existing within close proximity to each other in the diegetic world. The camera movement here also adds to the feeling of comfort and safety, whereas a number of edits could disrupt the fluidity of the shot and provide unnecessary tension or confusion for the viewer. Indeed the nature of this shot contrasts dramatically from shots of the water, where the majority have little camera movement and the number of cuts increases substantially. A second example of how editing establishes safety on the beach can be witnessed after the splashing montage in the water, when the film cuts to a static long shot of the young child building a sand castle. After a sequence with a number of sporadic cuts, the film returns to the placid setting of the beach. Contrasting heavily with the previous shots, the sound of the water and the children playing has abruptly ended—a dramatic difference achievable only through the use of a cut, unlike a pan where the sound would likely remain. The teen shown behind the young child, made possibly by employing a deep focus, calls for his missing dog, implicating the water as a danger once again. The viewer is inclined to assume that the animal is dead, and conversely, the teen’s safety seems indebted to his position on the beach. Finally, after the attack on Alex Kitner, the film eventually returns to a shot of the beach that restores order and mimics a number of qualities from the first shot in the sequence, providing a sense of conclusion. After the swarm of people are seen fleeing from the water in a vivid and frightening sequence—presumably shot by a hand held camera—the filmmaker cuts to a steady long shot. With a pan from right to left, the camera follows Alex’s mother as she walks through the crowd towards the water. The tone of the film changes instantly from a few shots prior, where the sound of splashing and yelling is replaced by the calming sound of waves on the beach. Instead of cutting to a close-up to witness the Mother’s facial expressions, the character walks towards the camera and the focus adjusts accordingly. This lack of editing mimics the first shot, where the immersion into the film is enhanced by the lack of disruption. This organic sense of safety is palpable through the use of editing—or lack thereof—in this crucial concluding shot. Overall, these three examples help to communicate the nature of the beach as a safe and secure space within the diegesis.

This sequence focuses heavily on Brody’s perspective, which is used to contrast both the danger of the water and the security of the beach. As he watches from the furthest part from the water, the film uses blocked cuts—that is, a jump cut using a figure to block the subject, providing the effect of a wipe—to overlay the edit and link particular elements together. The first and second use of a blocked cut simply provides a closer, but mostly identical, shot of Brody and decisively breaks the 30-degree rule. These disruptions to the conventions established thus far in the film add to the feeling of tension and act as a foreshadowing device. This also serves to pull the audience into his perspective. The following shots confirm this, as another blocked cut is used to change focus to a swimmer in the water. This helps to link Brody to this perspective despite the physical distance between them within the diegetic space. A second identification between the space of the water and that of the beach is seen when the two men try to speak to Brody. In this sequence of shots, editing is used to communicate the visual and metaphorical aspects of these spaces. When Brody talks to the first man, the film cuts to a shot that is almost from Brody’s point-of-view (the man looks off to the right of the screen and not into the camera). The frame is divided exactly in half, with the man’s face representing the beach and the water/swimmer representing the danger. A similar perspective is shown in the following conversation with Harry, where the point-of-view shot divides the frame into thirds: the back of Brody’s head, Harry’s face, and the water where the children play. Cutting to this perspective shot allows us to better understand Brody’s vantage point and engages the audience in all three spaces at the same time. Finally, from a metaphorical understanding, these two conversation shots further emphasize the differences between these spaces. Both point-of-view shots from Brody’s vantage point show an old man on the right and younger people in the water on the left. Younger characters in the film are revealed to be the true targets of the shark, as the first death was a teen, the second Alex Kitner and the third intended target was Brody’s son. The fact that the film cuts to a shot that effectively contrasts the differences in age dramatically against their respective spaces strengthens this analysis further. It serves to illustrate that Brody’s perspective acts as a bridge between these two spaces, contrasting them dramatically through the use of editing.

The final space identified within this sequence is that of the water, which represents danger vis-à-vis the editing. Firstly, one of the most obvious differences between the space of the water and that of the beach is the lack of any kind of establishing shot. The audience is not privy to the space they are seeing, but instead are presented with indistinguishable shots consisting entirely of water. The manner by which certain characters enter this space not only connects these individuals but also adds to the confusion and tension within the viewer. Throughout this sequence, the audience never witnesses anyone physically enter the water from the beach. The shots of Alex, the kids, and the dog are all shot without the beach in the frame. Even the first shot, which begins by following a large woman walking towards the water, eventually pans in the opposite direction to follow Alex. This perhaps serves to vindicate the woman and confirm her status as free from danger; instead we see Alex and the dog (both victims), as well as the children (potential targets) all enter the water. Indeed the only time characters break this barrier between the water and the beach is after the attack, when parents run into the water to save their children. This suggests that the shark attack has disrupted not only the psychology and stability of the characters and their lives, but also the spatial structure established thus far in the sequence. The graphic matching seen between the shots of Alex, the kids, and even the dog entering the water also call attention to this dangerous space. Indeed, both Alex and the dog become victims of the shark’s attack. When they enter the water the viewer is uncertain as to where they are positioned in comparison to characters like Brody or Alex’s mother—an effect achieved by using editing to distort the reproduction of this diegetic space. Another way that editing communicates the dangerous space of the water is seen during the splashing sequence after all the children enter. The audience witnesses an example of rhythmic editing where the splashing creates a frantic series of shots with unusually fast edits. There is no sense of continuity here and the lack of a spatial establishing shot to identify the individual children adds to the confusion. Another form of editing that identifies the water as dangerous comes from sound relationship between certain shots. The beach and water spaces are identified by cues in the soundtrack. The most obvious example of this is during the montage of shots after Alex enters the water for the first time. As he jumps into the water the only sound presented is that of his splashing; gone are the sounds from the beach and the frantic setting presented during the first shot. The film then cuts to a shot of an unidentified person floating in the water, then to that of the dog swimming, and then cuts back to Alex. This entire sequence runs without any sounds of the beach, even though Alex is merely jumping in the water and would be in the vicinity of these sounds. This helps identify these two spaces within the diegesis and separate them through the use such editing. Additionally, it allows the water to assume an ominous tone unlike the lively tone presented for the beach shots. The lack of sound, and the fact that the subjects are surrounded entirely by water, allows for suspense to build and to implicate these characters as targets. For all these aforementioned reasons, this sequence not only identifies this space as independent from that of the beach, but also seeks to impose a sense of danger through the editing techniques it employs.

This sequence is especially interesting to examine in terms of how it capitalizes on editing patterns to manipulate the physical space of the diegesis. The use of cutting during certain moments allows for tension to build and to effectively communicate the metaphorical meanings of both the beach and the water. More interesting is the lack of cuts, seen initially in the first shot of the sequence and then repeated again in the final shot after the attack. By avoiding an edit during these crucial moments, the filmmaker allows the audience to immerse themselves in the world of the narrative and feel secure within the environment of the beach. The majority of Jaws uses conventional invisible editing to engage the viewer. This sequence, by contrast, engrosses the viewer initially in order to create feelings of chaos by fracturing such conventions. These patterns are seen throughout the film and help to produce a suspenseful epic that owes a great deal of its effectiveness to the process of editing.

Byelections (don't worry Stephen Harper I said BY elections)

If you didn't already know, there was a federal byelection held in London today. It was a "tight race" between the Liberals and, most surprisingly, the Green party. But of course the Grits came out on top with almost 35% of the vote (and the Greens with 26%).


Elizabeth May (completely stoned)
Go Green!

Despite my vehement support for the NDP and their policy catering to the less fortunate, I was secretly rooting for the Green party in this particular election. Mostly based on the novelty of "being part of" the first Green party MP elected to parliament. But also based on a number of readings and this YouTube video that portrayed party candidate Elizabeth May most favourably. It also showed people from around Canada holding signs encouraging us to vote for her. (I'm sure these are real but you can imagine how easy it would be to fake these visuals.)

I couldn't help but search for related articles and I came across a piece in the Ottawa Citizen. "Twenty-six per cent of the vote is better than we had ever hoped. We never had more than 17 per cent before. This is a huge victory for us," said May. It's a "historic" event, as the writer of the article described, but hardly compared to actually winning. And I'm sure that a number of votes were drawn from the student populous (heavy on-campus campaigning for a number of weeks) as well as constituents who felt the same way I did: wouldn't it be cool to elect the Green MP! Statistics have shown that apathetic voters can be encouraged by trivial or timely matters like the novelty of change or election scandals. Voters who previously didn't give a damn may have been encouraged this time. But I suppose optimism is best since people may begin to recognize them as a legitimate party. And of course money from Elections Canada correlates to the number of votes... so despite popular belief, every vote does count--especially for the smaller parties.

As for my boys the NDP (specifically "girls" since the candidate was one Megan Walker), they didn't fare so well. Suddenly I feel less regret for not participating in their campaign, despite a 10AM trip downtown for a "campaign meeting." You see I was told we could participate by shadowing campaign veterans sent from Ottawa, but once I arrived they simply described the inner-workings of the campaign and volunteered me for canvassing that afternoon. What happened to this being a "meeting" fellas?

The article also makes a strange assertion about the reason for NDP's demise and I can't seem to understand it at this hour. Namely a "spat" between Walker and Liberal winner Glen Pearson, but it resulted in Pearson's director of communications being fired over internet comments that women "shouldn’t be allowed to run for office" and that gay marriage amounted to "a lifelong commitment to anal sex." These claims should be enough to shake the Liberal tree, but the focus was apparently on Walker after the Liberal team received an e-mail (apparently indirectly) from an NDP worker in Walker's campaign office which "gloated that the [statements were] 'pure gold' as ammunition to derail Pearson." Of course it's pure gold; are they shocked to hear that this would be used against them? I don't understand, this is politics after all. Using such comments are hardly offside in the political area of late. Which is worse: that the NDP is going to use this against a Liberal that said it, or that a Liberal said it?!

But another seat for the Liberals anyway...and it's not such a bad thing. Or maybe it is since London is in rough shape (see: downtown homelessness) and the cleavage between certain demographics is remarkable. I think you could blame London's previous MP... Liberal Joe Fontana.... London's MP for 18 years according to the Citizen. At least it's not a Conservative, I guess. Bye now.

Listening for this week: Okkervil River - For Real
A pretentious and artsy band (in my opinion) and this song probably the most radio-friendly tune found on their 11-track album Black Sheep Boy. I like it though.
November 26

The Hour - Canada's Jon Stewart... sorta

The CBC has enlisted George Stoumboulopolos to head their latest youth news offering called The Hour. I've been watching this show for the past few weeks I want you to check it out.

I called it Canada's Jon Stewart but that's only true in the sense that it's political commentary aimed at the savvy youth demographic. He doesn't do fake news so it doesn't exactly have the same entertainment punch. But that aside, its newsworthiness and George's charisma does a lot for keeping you tuned in. Not to mention that the show cashes in on all the CBC's conglomerate clout to pull in big name stars of both Canadian and international origin. I saw the Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunus a week before he appeared on Jon Stewart. Tonight's episode had General Rick Hillier from Ottawa, Jann Arden, K-OS, Kenny (of Kenny vs. Spenny) and Oscar winner Rachel Weiss. But surprisingly they were all pre-filmed interviews... this wasn't always the case.



Bits like "Best Story Ever," where guests describe the best story they have (Kenny had an anecdote about picking up some girl in a grocery store and finding out her sex play involved a saucer of cream and cat ears) and a new bit using a pseudo-George give a nice break from all the talky-talky.

One beef I have is that it's a Canadian audience and we're so damn respectful. There's no hollering like on Stewart or Colbert and laughter is reserved to a light chuckle or brief outburst. Bleh, not as good. Another thing is George always leans forward during his in-studio interviews. It just gets annoying; can someone get him an ergonomically correct chair please! But those are obviously trivial so don't listen to me.

Anyway it's worth checking out if you're around:
Sunday to Friday at 11pm on CBC
or
Sunday to Friday at 8pm on CBC Newsworld (channel 28 in Burlington)

You can also check out more details and last night's show at http://www.cbc.ca/thehour/.


 
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